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An Opportunity for Reform 
TENNESSEE SECONDARY SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 
V. BRENTWOOD ACADEMY AND NCAA RECRUITING 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, news broke that the Colorado University football 
program had used sex, drugs, and alcohol to lure recruits to the school.1 
An investigative panel reviewing the incidents issued a fifty-page report, 
in which it found that player-hosts “felt pressured to impress recruits and 
resorted to providing alcohol, drugs and sex, including visits to strip 
clubs and the hiring of strippers.”2 While the nation’s colleges and 
universities and their coaches condemned Colorado’s practices,3 
regrettably, the truth is that Colorado University was neither the first nor 
the last school to engage in such scandalous recruiting.4 In fact, evidence 
suggests that the occurrence of these practices is increasing.5  
Unfortunately, these improper recruiting practices are a product 
of the current state of intercollegiate athletics. According to colleges and 
  
 1 Steven K. Paulson, Panel Probing Colorado Issues Blistering Report, SEATTLE TIMES, 
May 19, 2004, at D14.  
 2 Id. According to the report, there was no evidence that officials condoned the 
misconduct; however, it did suggest that they were “lazy, ineffective or simply ignored what was 
going on . . . .” Id. 
 3 See Greg Wallace, Winds of Change: College Recruiting Set to Get Major Overhaul, 
BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, May 24, 2004, at 8 (discussing how the Colorado incident and another 
recruiting scandal at the University of Miami would lead to changes in NCAA recruiting rules and 
predicting that such changes would be welcomed by many coaches).  
 4 See, e.g., Brad Wolverton, NCAA Says Athletics Infractions Cases Will Reach a 
Record High This Year, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Sept. 19, 2007, available at 
http://chronicle.com/daily/2007/09/2007091904n.htm. The history of collegiate recruiting illustrates 
that no matter what occurs, college coaches have continued to engage in illegal and ethically 
questionable recruiting tactics. See Andy Staples, A History of Recruiting; How Coaches Have 
Stayed a Step Ahead, SI.COM, June 23, 2008, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/andy_staples/ 
06/19/recruiting.main/index.html?eref=T. 
 5 See Wolverton, supra note 4. According to Wolverton, the NCAA’s enforcement staff 
was on pace to complete twenty major infraction cases in 2007, a third more than 2006, and twice 
the number it handled in 2002. Id. In addition, athletic departments reported about 3500 minor rules 
violations for 2006, about fifty percent more than in 2002. Id.; see also Daniel F. Mahoney et al., 
Ethics in Intercollegiate Athletics: An Examination of NCAA Violations and Penalties—1952-1997, 
in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 447, 449 (Scott R. Rosner & Kenneth L. Shropshire eds., 2004) 
(providing data that shows the number of men’s programs penalized has risen from 7.1 per year in 
the 1950s to 18.5 in the 1990s). 
  Notably, David Price, the NCAA’s vice president for enforcement, suggests that the 
rise in violations may be the result of the NCAA’s commitment to speedier investigations and 
colleges’ devotion to greater compliance with the rules. Wolverton, supra note 4. For more on 
NCAA enforcement, see infra Part III.C.3. 
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universities, the purpose of college athletics is to enhance the educational 
experience of the student.6 To preserve this end, many of America’s 
schools have joined the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(“NCAA”), an independent body charged with governing intercollegiate 
athletics.7 Consistent with the goals of its member institutions, the 
NCAA claims that college athletics is an avocation: a recreational 
activity meant to ensure that “the educational experience of the student-
athlete is paramount.”8 Yet, despite this profession, college athletics has 
become much more than an avocation, as colleges and universities have 
become focused on achieving athletic prowess, even at the expense of 
academic excellence.9 
Consumed by a need to achieve athletic success, many coaches 
resort to questionable recruiting tactics.10 To prevent such measures, the 
NCAA has adopted an extensive set of rules governing the recruitment of 
student-athletes.11 Nonetheless, despite the NCAA’s efforts, coaches still 
continue to commit recruiting violations, and, perhaps even worse, 
engage in questionable conduct that is not proscribed by the recruiting 
rules.12 This persistent usurpation of both NCAA and ethical standards 
indicates that NCAA recruiting rules need to be drastically changed.13  
  
 6 See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT DIVISION OF ATHLETICS, 2007-08 STUDENT-
ATHLETE HANDBOOK 3 (2007), available at http://www.uconnhuskies.com/MainLinks/AboutUconn/ 
0708%20SA%20Handbook%20revised.pdf. 
 7 The NCAA is not the only governing body of college athletics—other prominent 
collegiate athletic associations include, for example, the National Association of Intercollegiate 
Athletics (“NAIA”) and the National Junior College Athletic Association (“NJCAA”)—but it is the 
largest and most prominent regulator of college athletics and thus will be the focus of this Note.  
 8 NCAA, Our Mission, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=1352 (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2009). 
 9 See discussion infra Parts III.B.3, III.C.3.  
 10 See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
 11 See, e.g., NCAA, 2008-09 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 77-125 (2008) [hereinafter 
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/ProductsDetailView.aspx? 
sku=D109. The NCAA has manuals that set forth the rules governing all three divisions of 
intercollegiate athletics. See NCAA, Rules and Bylaws, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=19 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009).  
 12 According to David Price, because of the recent rule changes and the emphasis on 
compliance, recruiting tactics have become “increasingly creative.” Wolverton, supra note 4. 
Throughout history, coaches have been one step ahead of the NCAA. See Staples, supra note 4 
(quoting Conference USA Commissioner Britton Banowsky as saying that “[e]very time [the 
NCAA] change[s] the rules, somebody comes up with something”). After the NCAA passes a rule, 
coaches will find some creative way to get around it, after which the NCAA will pass a new rule 
banning the conduct, and the cycle will repeat itself. See id. (providing a history of coaches skirting 
NCAA recruiting rules); Dana O’Neil, Gray Scale: Recruiters Struggle with Perfectly Legal Yet 
Ethically Questionable, ESPN.COM, Nov. 19, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/columns/story?id= 
3710807&lpos=spotlight&lid=tab4pos1 (discussing ways in which recruiting rules are now being 
circumvented, in violation of the intent of the rule, as well as flat-out broken). 
  A good example of this is shown by the fact that, after the NCAA banned sending text 
messages to recruits, coaches began using different practices to get around the ban. Andy Staples, 
Beating the System: With Texting Outlawed, Coaches Turn to E-mail; Notes, SI.COM, Jan, 14, 2008 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/andy_staples/01/14/recruiting.notebook/index.html. 
One method is to e-mail recruits—currently, the NCAA allows unlimited emailing—since, for 
recruits able to receive e-mail on their phones, an e-mail to them is essentially the same as a text 
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Fortunately, a recent decision by the Supreme Court in 
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. Brentwood Academy 
(“Brentwood II”),14 can be the catalyst for such a change.15 In Brentwood 
II, the Supreme Court upheld a high school athletic association’s Anti-
Recruiting Rule against a First Amendment challenge by one of its 
member schools.16 The Rule effectively prevented recruiting by 
prohibiting a school from using undue influence on a student in order to 
retain his admission for athletic purposes.17 In upholding the Rule, the 
Court applied its public employee speech doctrine because of Brentwood 
Academy’s voluntary decision to join the Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Association (“TSSAA”).18  
This Note focuses on the Brentwood II decision and the potential 
implications it will have on NCAA recruiting. Specifically, it argues that 
the NCAA is entitled to the same broad authority to limit recruiting as 
the Supreme Court gave to the TSSAA. Ultimately, while an 
intercollegiate athletic association and high school athletic association 
are certainly different, given the reasoning of the Court in Brentwood II 
and other cases, this Note claims that the Court would, in the context of 
recruiting, treat the NCAA no differently than the TSSAA, and thus 
would permit the NCAA to effectively ban the athletic recruitment of 
high school student-athletes.   
Part II begins by discussing the relevant background of the 
Brentwood II case. It then sets forth the development and parameters of 
the public employee speech doctrine, and how it was applied in 
Brentwood II. Part III then analyzes the implications Brentwood II could 
have on the NCAA. After briefly looking at the background of the 
NCAA, Part III examines whether the Court would be inclined to apply 
the public employee speech doctrine to collegiate recruiting. It then 
addresses what the likely result would be, under current public employee 
speech law, if the NCAA were to pass a recruiting ban similar to the 
  
message. Id. Another method coaches have used is to have one of his or her players text message a 
recruit. Id.  
 13 The NCAA Rule Book only contributes to the current state of recruiting. The 439 
page-long book, with forty-nine pages devoted to recruiting alone, not only makes it difficult for 
coaches to understand all the rules, but also leaves a lot of room for interpretation. See O’Neil, supra 
note 12; NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at 77-125.     
 14 Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 
2489 (2007). 
 15 See David G. Savage & Eric Sondheimer, Justices Uphold High School Anti-
Recruiting Rule, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 22, 2007, at 13 (quoting Elsa Kircher Cole, general counsel for the 
NCAA, as saying “[t]his will have an impact on all athletic associations, at whatever level, to make 
and enforce rules like this one involving recruiting”). 
 16 Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2490-91. 
 17 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 673 
(M.D. Tenn. 1998), rev’d, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), on remand, 262 
F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 18 Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2495-96.  
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TSSAA’s.19 Finally, Part IV briefly discusses why the NCAA should 
establish a recruiting ban and how such a ban could be implemented.  
II.  BRENTWOOD II  
A.  Facts 
The TSSAA is a private, voluntary association of public, 
independent, and parochial secondary schools from the state of 
Tennessee.20 Its purpose is “to stimulate and regulate the athletic relations 
of the secondary schools in Tennessee.”21 One of the TSSAA’s members 
is Brentwood Academy, an independent college-preparatory school 
located in Brentwood, Tennessee.22  
In order to prevent member schools from recruiting middle 
school student-athletes for their athletic programs, the TSSAA has 
promulgated an Anti-Recruiting Rule.23 The Anti-Recruiting Rule, 
located in TSSAA Bylaws Section 21 reads: 
The use of undue influence on a student (with or without an athletic record), his 
or her parents or guardians of a student by any person connected, or not 
connected, with the school to secure or to retain a student for athletic purposes 
shall be a violation of the recruiting rule.24 
The circumstances of the case arose in 1997, when Brentwood 
Academy’s head football coach, Carlton Flatt, sent a letter to middle 
school students, inviting them to participate in spring football practice.25 
The letter explained that “getting involved as soon as possible would 
definitely be to your advantage,” and was signed, “Your Coach.”26 
Although the boys who received the letter had already agreed to attend 
Brentwood Academy in the fall, they had not yet enrolled in the school 
as defined by the TSSAA.27 As a result, the TSSAA found that Coach 
  
 19 This Note suggests implementing an NCAA recruiting ban that is similar to the 
TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule, which prevents coaches from asserting undue pressure on a student 
and his or her parents or guardians to retain the student’s services for athletic purposes. Brentwood, 
13 F. Supp. 2d at 673. This hypothetical “NCAA recruiting ban,” referred to throughout this Note, 
would prevent a coach from influencing a student-athlete to attend his school for the purposes of 
athletics. It would not prevent unilateral activity by the student-athlete, such as sending video of 
themselves to coaches, in order to bolster his chance for admission. See infra Part IV.  
 20 Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 673. 
 21 Id.  
 22 Id.  
 23 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 442 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir. 
2006), rev’d, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 
2489 (2007).  
 24 Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 673. 
 25 Id. at 676. Coach Flatt also called the students to tell them that “they should not 
participate in spring practice if it conflicted with activities at their respective middle schools.” Id. 
 26 Id.  
 27 Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 
2489, 2492 (2007) (The TSSAA defines enrolled as having “attended 3 days of school.”).  
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Flatt’s letter violated its Anti-Recruiting Rule and imposed sanctions on 
Brentwood Academy.28 
On December 12, 1997, Brentwood Academy filed an action 
against the TSSAA in the U.S. District Court, Middle District of 
Tennessee, to contest the penalties.29 Brentwood brought suit under 
§ 1983,30 alleging that the Anti-Recruiting Rule violated its First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech.31 After concluding that the 
TSSAA was a state actor subject to suit under § 1983, the district court 
agreed with Brentwood, holding that the TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule 
violated the First Amendment.32 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that 
the TSSAA was not a state actor and thus not subject to § 1983 liability.33 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court on the threshold 
issue, concluding that the TSSAA was indeed a state actor, and 
remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit for adjudication on the 
merits of Brentwood’s claims.34 After both the district court and court of 
appeals held that the Anti-Recruiting Rule violated Brentwood’s free 
speech rights,35 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide 
Brentwood’s First Amendment claim.36 In addressing the 
constitutionality of the Anti-Recruiting Rule, the Court applied a line of 
  
 28 Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 676-77. The TSSAA also found that Brentwood coaches 
had violated the Anti-Recruiting Rule for: (1) admitting student-athletes to athletic contests free of 
charge, and (2) conducting impermissible off-season practice with Brentwood student-athletes. Id. 
However, for the purposes of Brentwood’s First Amendment claim, the only violation at issue was 
the one regarding Coach Flatt’s letter.  
 29 Id. at 678. The dispute between Brentwood and the TSSAA has been quite lengthy. 
Since Brentwood Academy filed its action, the case has produced two decisions by the Supreme 
Court, three by the Sixth Circuit, and two by the Middle District of Tennessee. Brentwood, 13 F. 
Supp. 2d 670 (M.D. Tenn. 1998), rev’d, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), rehearing en banc denied, 
190 F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), on 
remand, 262 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002), on remand, 304 F. Supp. 
2d 981 (M.D. Tenn. 2003), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, and remanded, 442 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2006), 
rehearing en banc denied, cert. granted, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 
127 S. Ct. 852 (2007), rev’d and remanded, 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007). 
 30 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 permits a cause of action against any person 
who, when acting under color of law, deprives another of any Constitutional Rights. Id. This, of 
course, includes the right to freedom of speech. See U.S. CONST. amend I.  
 31 Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 678. Brentwood also alleged (1) that the TSSAA 
violated its Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights, (2) that the 
TSSAA violated federal antitrust laws, (3) equitable estoppel, and (4) unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary, 
and oppressive action in violation of state law. Id. at 672. 
 32 Id. at 694. 
 33 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir. 
1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
 34 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n (Brentwood I), 531 U.S. 
288, 290-91, 305 (2001). 
 35 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 304 F. Supp. 2d 981, 997 
(M.D. Tenn. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 442 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2006), rev’d 
and remanded, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007); 
Brentwood, 442 F.3d at 430-31.  
 36 Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 
852 (2007).  
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cases traditionally reserved for determining the free speech rights of 
public employees.37  
B.  Speech Rights in Public Employment 
While the First Amendment protects the right to engage in free 
speech without government interference,38 it is well settled that this right 
is not absolute.39 Throughout its history, one area in which the Court has 
consistently allowed government interference with free speech rights has 
been public employment.40 Before the 1950s, courts gave public 
employees no First Amendment protection, allowing public employers to 
restrict their employees’ speech without repercussions.41 During this 
time, most courts adopted the view of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who 
concluded in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford42 that, because there 
was no constitutional right to public employment, there was no right to 
freedom of speech in public employment.43  
By the mid-twentieth century, however, courts’ refusal to 
recognize public employee speech rights began to erode. Beginning in 
the 1950s the Supreme Court began recognizing that some limited First 
Amendment protection extended to public employment.44 Eventually, in 
1968, the Court finally rejected the reasoning in McAuliffe, officially 
recognizing in Pickering v. Board of Education that public employees 
have certain free speech rights in the workplace.45  
  
 37 Id. at 2495. The line of cases that sets the standard for the restriction of speech in 
public employment begins with Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See 
discussion infra Part II.B. Prior to the decision in Brentwood II, Pickering applied only to the speech 
rights of government employees and contractors, not to speech by an employee at a private school 
that is a member of a private athletic association. Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2499 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 38 U.S. CONST. amend I. Although the Constitution only protects the right of free speech 
from congressional interference, the Supreme Court has since held that the right to freedom of 
speech is a fundamental right protected against the states by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. 
Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).  
 39 Chapinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood 
that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”). 
 40 See Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First 
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1464-67 (2007). 
 41 Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public Employee Speech: 
Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (And Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REV. 939, 945-46 (2001). 
 42 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 43 Id. at 518. Holmes’ oft-cited opinion was that “The petitioner may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” Id. at 517.  
 44 See Lara Geer Farley, Comment, A Matter of Public Concern: “Official Duties” of 
Employment Gag Public Employee Free Speech Rights, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 603, 610 (2007) (citing 
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)). In Wieman, the Court found unconstitutional an 
Oklahoma statute that required all public employees to take a loyalty oath, holding that 
“constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is 
patently arbitrary or discriminatory.” Wieman, 344 U.S. at 186, 192.   
 45 See Wells, supra note 41, at 946. 
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The decision in Pickering has remained the law regarding public 
employee speech rights for the past forty years without much alteration.46 
However, the Court has added two important threshold requirements. 
These requirements are set forth in Connick v. Myers47 and Garcetti v. 
Ceballos.48 Together, these three cases have established a three-pronged 
test that is used when determining the free speech rights of public 
employees.49  
1. Pickering v. Board of Education 
The landmark public employee speech case began when Marvin 
Pickering, a high school teacher in Will County, Illinois, wrote a letter to 
a local newspaper criticizing the local school board.50 The letter attacked 
the school’s handling of a bond proposal as well as the subsequent 
allocation of the financial resources it received from the proposal.51 In 
response to this letter, the school board dismissed Pickering.52 After his 
dismissal, Pickering challenged the board’s decision, alleging that his 
speech was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.53 The 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Pickering and, in the process, 
established a balancing test that delineated the contours of public 
employee free speech rights.54  
In setting forth the standard for protecting public employee 
speech, the Court acknowledged the unique situation public employment 
presented. Specifically, it noted that although a public employee has no 
constitutional right to employment, once employed, a public employee 
may not be subject to arbitrary and unreasonable conditions of 
employment.55 Thus, the problem before the Court was determining the 
extent of a public employee’s free speech rights in the context of these 
conflicting tenets. As its solution, the Court adopted a balancing test that 
weighs the interests of a public employee, “as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern against the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of its public services . . . .”56 
Applying this test, the Court concluded that since Pickering’s statements 
neither interfered with his duties nor disrupted the regular operation of 
  
 46 See Estlund, supra note 40, at 1466 (stating that Pickering “has been refined but has 
not varied much over the years”). 
 47 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 48 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
 49 Hereinafter, the Pickering-Connick-Garcetti decisions will be referred to as the 
Pickering doctrine.  
 50 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564-66 (1968). 
 51 Id. at 565-66. 
 52 Id. at 566.  
 53 Id. at 564-65. 
 54 Id. at 574-75 
 55 Id. at 568. 
 56 Id. This test will be referred to as the Pickering balancing test. 
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the schools, the school had no interest in limiting Pickering’s speech.57 
Consequently, its dismissal of Pickering violated his First Amendment 
rights.58 
2. Connick v. Myers 
After the Court’s decision in Pickering, the public employee 
speech doctrine remained mostly unchanged until the Court added a 
threshold requirement in 1983.59 In Connick v. Myers, Sheila Myers, an 
Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans, was fired after she engaged 
in speech at her workplace.60 Myers, who was upset that she was being 
transferred to another criminal court, prepared and distributed a 
questionnaire that was meant to solicit the views of fifteen assistant 
district attorneys on various issues, including “the office transfer policy, 
office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of 
confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work 
in political campaigns.”61 After one assistant district attorney reported 
that Myers was creating a “mini-insurrection” within the office, her 
supervisor, Harry Connick, fired her for her refusal to accept the 
transfer.62 
Myers challenged her termination, alleging that it was a violation 
of her free speech rights as set forth in Pickering.63 However, before 
addressing whether Myers’ discharge was protected under the Pickering 
balancing test, the Court held that it must first determine whether Myers’ 
questionnaire constituted “speech on a matter of public concern.”64 In so 
holding, the Court established a threshold requirement to the public 
employee speech doctrine.  
The Court reasoned that this threshold requirement is necessary 
because an employer should be granted broad discretion to manage its 
employees when their speech does not relate to the concerns of the 
community.65 According to the Court, “when a public employee speaks 
not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an 
employee upon matters only of personal interest,” the employer, except 
under the most unusual circumstances, is entitled to take action against 
the employee.66 Whether speech “addresses a matter of public concern” is 
  
 57 Id. at 572-73. 
 58 Id. at 574-75.  
 59 See Estlund, supra note 40, at 1466-67.  
 60 461 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1983). 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. at 141. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 146.  
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 147. 
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determined by the “content, form, and context of a given statement, as 
revealed by the whole record.”67 
Looking at the content, form, and context of Myers’ 
questionnaire, the Court concluded that only one of the questions 
survived this threshold test: whether assistant district attorneys “ever feel 
pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported 
candidates.”68 According to the Court, the questions pertaining to the 
office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, 
and the level of confidence in supervisors were “mere extensions” of 
Myers’ personal grievance.69 Ultimately, the Court found that these 
questions were aimed to give Myers ammunition against her superiors, 
and not to evaluate the performance of a public office.70 Such questions 
convey nothing except that one employee is upset with the status quo.71 
The Court did apply the Pickering balancing test to the one 
question that did address a matter of public concern—whether assistant 
district attorneys “ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on 
behalf of office supported candidates.”72 Nonetheless, the Court found 
the speech was unprotected, and Myers’ discharge was not prevented by 
the First Amendment, because it touched upon a matter of public concern 
in only the most limited sense and her supervisor could reasonably 
believe the speech would disrupt the workplace.73  
3. Garcetti v. Ceballos 
The Connick and Pickering decisions established a two-tiered 
test to public employee speech cases.74 The Court first asks whether “the 
employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”75 If the 
answer is yes, the Court then asks whether the employer had an 
“adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any 
other member of the general public.”76 In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court 
established a second threshold requirement for public employee speech 
cases.77  
  
 67 Id. at 147-48.  
 68 Id. at 149 (quoting questionnaire created by New Orleans Assistant District Attorney) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69 Id. at 148. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72  Id. at 149 (quoting questionnaire created by New Orleans Assistant District Attorney) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73 Id. at 154. 
 74 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006). 
 75 Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
 76 Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). To answer this 
question, the Court used the Pickering balancing test.  
 77 See Ralph D. Mawdsley & Allan Osborne, The Supreme Court Provides New 
Direction for Employee Free Speech in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 214 ED. LAW REP. 457, 459 (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has injected a new interpretive clarification as to when employee’s speech is 
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Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney for the Los 
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office.78 In 2000, a defense attorney 
asked Ceballos to review an affidavit used in a search warrant.79 Ceballos 
reviewed the affidavit and found many inaccuracies.80 After 
communicating these inaccuracies to his supervisors, Ceballos claimed 
he was subjected to numerous retaliatory employment actions, for which 
he brought suit.81  
In denying Ceballos’ claim, the Court stressed that the 
“controlling factor” in the case was the fact that Ceballos’ expression 
was made pursuant to his official duties as a calendar deputy and not as a 
citizen.82 According to the Court, when public employees speak 
“pursuant to their official duties, [they] are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes,” and thus are not protected by the 
Constitution.83 Because Ceballos was speaking pursuant to his official 
duties, the Court dismissed Ceballos’ claim without determining whether 
his speech addressed a matter of public concern or satisfied the Pickering 
balancing test. Consequently, the Court established a third prong in the 
test for determining whether a public employee’s speech is 
constitutionally protected.84  
Despite the addition of the two threshold requirements, the 
public employee speech doctrine has not been changed substantially.  
Moreover, all indications showed that this doctrine was limited to 
protecting the speech of public employees or independent contractors.85 
Nevertheless, in Brentwood II, the Court extended the Pickering doctrine 
beyond public employment and independent contracting to determine 
whether a high school athletic association could limit the recruiting 
speech of its private member institutions. 
C. The Decision in Brentwood II 
The issue before the Court in Brentwood II was whether the 
TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule, which essentially prohibits the athletic 
recruitment of middle school student-athletes, violated Brentwood 
Academy’s free speech rights. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme 
  
protected as that of a citizen.”); Farley, supra note 44, at 613-14 (stating that Garcetti v. Ceballos 
“add[ed] another test to its public employee speech analysis”). 
 78 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955. 
 79 Id.  
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. at 1956. 
 82 Id. at 1959-60. Neither party in the case disputed that Ceballos “wrote the memo 
pursuant to his . . . duties.” Id. at 1961. 
 83 Id. at 1960. 
 84 Id. at 1959-62. 
 85 See Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. 
Ct. 2489, 2499 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, and held that the Anti-Recruiting Rule 
did not violate the First Amendment.86  
Eight members of the Court agreed with Justice Stevens’ 
application of the Pickering line of cases to uphold the Anti-Recruiting 
Rule.87 Although there was little support for the extension of the 
Pickering doctrine to a situation involving a private school in a private 
athletic association,88 the Court found that applying Pickering was 
appropriate here because Brentwood Academy voluntarily joined the 
TSSAA.89 The Court found this situation similar to the public 
employment context, noting that the TSSAA’s interest in enforcing its 
rules can sometimes warrant curtailing the speech of a member 
institution,90 “[j]ust as the government’s interest in running an effective 
workplace can in some circumstances outweigh employee speech 
rights . . . .”91  
Applying the three-part Pickering doctrine, the Court did not 
analyze the two threshold questions, choosing instead to assume that 
Coach Flatt was speaking as a citizen about a matter of public concern.92 
Rather, the Court focused solely on the third prong: the Pickering 
balancing test. Rephrasing the balancing test in terms of the facts of the 
case, the Court stated that the TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule would be 
upheld only if it was “necessary to managing an efficient and effective 
state-sponsored high school athletic league.”93  
  
 86 Id. at 2493 (majority opinion). 
 87 Id. at 2495-96. It should be noted that, in addition to finding the Anti-Recruiting Rule 
constitutional under Pickering, Justice Stevens found an alternative justification for upholding the 
Anti-Recruiting Rule. Id. at 2495. In Part II.A of his opinion, Justice Stevens held the TSSAA’s 
Anti-Recruiting Rule constitutional under Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978)—
which held that direct solicitation by a lawyer that exerts undue pressure on clients could be 
prohibited—because recruiting, which exerts undue influence on a child, could prevent informed and 
reliable decision-making. Id. However, only three other Justices agreed with Stevens; a majority of 
Justices refused to extend Ohralik beyond the parameters of that case—i.e., the attorney-client 
relationship. Id. at 2498 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Because this additional part of Stevens’ analysis 
was rejected by a majority of the Court, this Note will not address it.   
 88 See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 442 F.3d 410, 
421-23 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Pickering line of cases did not apply to the instant situation), 
rev’d, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007); Brentwood 
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 304 F. Supp. 2d 981 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (no mention 
of Pickering line in decision), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 442 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 
2006), rev’d and remanded, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 
2489 (2007).  
 89 Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2495-96. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
exemplifies the importance that Brentwood’s voluntary participation in the TSSAA had in the 
Court’s decision. According to Kennedy, absent Brentwood’s consensual participation in the 
TSSAA, the speech by Coach Flatt would be entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 2498-99 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 90 Id. at 2495 (majority opinion) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984)). 
 91 Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).  
 92 Id.  
 93 Id. 
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Analyzing the purpose of the Anti-Recruiting Rule, the Court 
found that it was indeed necessary for the TSSAA to operate efficiently 
and effectively.94 The TSSAA established the Rule because athletic 
recruiting of middle school students could “lead to exploitation [of 
student-athletes], distort competition between high school teams, and 
foster an environment in which athletics are [sic] prized more highly than 
academics.”95 According to the Court, any one of these harms would 
inhibit a high school athletic association’s ability to operate “efficiently 
and effectively.”96 Therefore, since the Anti-Recruiting Rule discouraged 
the conduct—recruiting—that might lead to these harms, the Court held 
that the Rule did not violate Brentwood’s free speech rights.97  
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR NCAA RECRUITING  
In Brentwood II, the Court granted broad discretion to a high 
school athletic association to limit the recruitment of student-athletes.98 
However, given the reasoning of the decision, Brentwood II could 
potentially have a drastic effect on college recruiting. Although it 
governs college, and not high school, athletics, the NCAA is very similar 
to the TSSAA in its composition, purpose, and values.99 Moreover, the 
difference between the NCAA and the TSSAA is minimal in terms of 
athletic recruiting. Thus, the likely effect of the Court’s decision in 
  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 2495-96 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60 (1973)). 
 96 Id. at 2496 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006)). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See discussion supra Part II (TSSAA) and discussion infra Part III.A (NCAA). The 
glaring difference between the two is that the NCAA governs the athletics of colleges and 
universities throughout the country, as opposed to the athletics of high schools within a state. For the 
Supreme Court, this distinction has proved crucial in the context of state action. In Brentwood I, the 
Court held that the TSSAA was a state actor that was subject to suit under § 1983. Brentwood Acad. 
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n (Brentwood I), 531 U.S. 288, 305 (2001). Contrarily, the 
Court has held that the NCAA is not a state actor, and thus cannot be sued under § 1983. NCAA v. 
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988). Accordingly, the NCAA could restrict all speech, making the 
issue as to whether the Pickering doctrine applies moot.  
  However, since the decision in Brentwood I, some commentators have argued that 
under the Court’s reasoning in Brentwood I, the NCAA may now be considered a state actor. See, 
e.g., Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2499 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the 
application of the majority’s entwinement test could easily change the result of Tarkanian); James 
Potter, Note, The NCAA as State Actor: Tarkanian, Brentwood, and Due Process, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
1269, 1303 (2007); Robin Petronella, Comment, A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Machiavellian 
Approach to Government Action and the Implications of its Recent Decision in Brentwood Academy 
v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 31 STETSON L. REV. 1057, 1082-83 (2002). 
Furthermore, even if the NCAA is not a state actor, its rules can be subjected to § 1983 liability if 
they are adopted by a college or university that is a state actor. See Howard M. Wasserman, Fans, 
Free Expression, and the Wide World of Sports, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 525, 540 (2006) (stating that 
NCAA rules become subject to the First Amendment when a public university adopts them as their 
own). Thus, an NCAA recruiting ban could easily come under the scope of the First Amendment 
and, as such, this Note will work under the assumption that an NCAA recruiting ban would be 
subject to § 1983 liability, knowing that, if the NCAA and its member institutions are not state 
actors, recruiting speech could still be restricted.  
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Brentwood II is that, like the TSSAA, the NCAA could, if it so desired, 
prohibit the recruitment of student-athletes.  
A.  Background of the NCAA 
The NCAA is a private, voluntary organization that governs 
intercollegiate athletics among many of America’s colleges and 
universities.100 It is comprised of over 1,200 schools,101 which appoint 
volunteer representatives who introduce and vote on bylaws and 
establish programs to govern, promote, and further the purposes and 
goals of intercollegiate athletics.102  
The stated purpose of the NCAA is to “govern competition in a 
fair, safe, equitable and sportsmanlike manner, and to integrate 
intercollegiate athletics into higher education so that the educational 
experience of the student-athlete is paramount.”103 Among the NCAA’s 
core values are its commitment to:  
The collegiate model of athletics in which students participate as an avocation, 
balancing their academic, social and athletics experiences . . . . The highest 
levels of integrity and sportsmanship . . . . The supporting role that 
intercollegiate athletics plays in the higher education mission and in enhancing 
the sense of community and strengthening the identity of member 
institutions . . . .104 
To abide by these core values, the NCAA has instituted 
regulations that govern its member institutions in areas such as 
amateurism, ethical conduct, eligibility, and recruiting.105 The NCAA 
recruiting rules clearly reflect the stated core values. According to The 
Principle Governing Recruiting, “Recruiting regulations shall . . . shield 
[prospective student athletes] from undue pressures that may interfere 
with the scholastic or athletics interests of the prospective student-
athletes or their educational institutions.”106  
The composition, purpose, and values of the NCAA are 
undoubtedly similar to the TSSAA, an organization that is also 
composed of voluntary member institutions and strives to create a level 
  
 100 NCAA, About the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=2 (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2009).  
 101 NCAA, Composition and Sport Sponsorship of the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ 
ncaa?ContentID=811 (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 102 NCAA, Overview, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=435 (last visited Jan. 3, 
2009). 
 103 NCAA, Our Mission, supra note 8. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at iii-v.   
 106 Id. at art. 2.11. The Principle Governing Recruiting is part of the NCAA Constitution 
and is also applicable to both Division II and Division III member institutions. See NCAA, 2008-09 
NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL art. 2.11 (2008), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/ProductsDetail 
View.aspx?sku=D209; NCAA, 2008-09 NCAA DIVISION III MANUAL art. 2.11 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/ProductsDetailView.aspx?sku=D309.  
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playing-field, protect student-athletes, and emphasize the primacy of 
education.107  Of course, the difference between the NCAA and the 
TSSAA is the fact that one governs intercollegiate athletics and one high 
school athletics. To some, this single difference is a critical one.108 
Ultimately, however, it is unlikely that this difference is sufficient to 
circumscribe the Court’s reasoning in Brentwood II from being applied 
to the NCAA.  
B.  High School vs. College: Why Brentwood II-Pickering 
Jurisprudence Should Apply to NCAA Recruiting 
Unquestionably, there are some universally recognized 
differences between high school and college athletics.109 Because of these 
differences, an argument can certainly be made that the recruiting 
practices of high schools and colleges should receive different 
constitutional protections. Indeed, there are situations in which courts 
have distinguished between colleges and high schools when affording 
First Amendment protection. For example, courts have limited the free 
speech rights of high school students much more than those of college 
students in certain circumstances.110 The basis for this distinction is the 
idea that “high school students are less mature and the missions of the 
respective institutions are different.”111  
Because the Court has previously distinguished between high 
schools and colleges when delineating free speech rights and because it 
applied Pickering without much direction, it is arguable that the 
TSSAA’s status as a high school athletic association was critical to the 
  
 107 See infra notes 128, 129 and accompanying text.  
 108 See Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 
674-75 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (TSSAA “Guidelines for Understanding the ‘Recruiting Rule’ and 
Understanding What Is ‘Undue Influence’” state, “High school athletics is not the same as colleges 
recruiting high school athletes for college athletics. High school athletics exist[s] for an entirely 
different reason.”), rev’d, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), on remand, 262 
F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2001).  
 109 See supra note 108.  
 110 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 
238 n.4 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[C]ases dealing with the right of teaching institutions to 
limit expressive freedom of students has been confined to high schools whose students and their 
schools’ relation to them are different . . . from their counterparts in college education.”) (internal 
citations omitted); see also Mark J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The 
Case Against Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1948 (2002) 
(noting the “stark” distinction between the Court’s recognition of college and high school free 
expression). But see Kerry Brain Melear, The First Amendment and Freedom of Press on the Public 
University Campus: An Analysis of Hosty v. Carter, 216 ED. LAW REP. 293 (2007) (noting that this 
distinction may begin to blur with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 
(7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1330 (2006)). 
  In addition, courts have also limited the rights of children to be exposed to harmful 
and inappropriate material. See infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text. 
 111 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 740 (Evans, J., dissenting). Other courts have agreed that college 
students are more mature than high school students. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 
n.14 (1981); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1970); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 
1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004).   
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Supreme Court’s decision in Brentwood II. Under this argument, because 
the TSSAA’s status was critical to the application of Pickering, the Court 
could decide that its application is improper as to the NCAA, a college 
athletic association.  
Yet, while such a distinction is possible, it is unlikely the Court 
would make it in the context of recruiting for three reasons. First, the 
language and reasoning of the Brentwood II decision do not suggest a 
different analysis would apply for college athletic associations. Second, 
the Court has never distinguished between high schools and colleges 
when applying Pickering. Third, the differences between high school and 
college students and the missions of the respective institutions, both of 
which warrant granting different constitutional protections in other 
arenas, are largely irrelevant with regard to athletic recruiting.  
1. Language and Reasoning of Brentwood II 
Despite the fact that Brentwood II was a territory in which 
Pickering had yet to be applied—i.e., speech by a private school that is a 
member of a private athletic association—the Supreme Court had no 
problem extending the public employee speech doctrine to the TSSAA’s 
Anti-Recruiting Rule.112 There was little explanation underlying the 
Court’s decision to apply the Pickering doctrine to the instant 
circumstances. Rather, its application appeared to stem from the Court’s 
determination to limit Brentwood Academy’s speech rights because of its 
voluntary decision to join the TSSAA.113 So determined, the Court 
decided that the Pickering line should apply because an “athletic league’s 
interest in enforcing its rules” is similar to “the government’s interest in 
running an effective workplace.”114  
The Court’s failure to further explain exactly why it applied the 
Pickering doctrine in Brentwood II suggests that the doctrine’s 
application was based solely on Brentwood Academy’s voluntarily 
  
 112 This extension may seem logical since the TSSAA is a state actor and § 1983 liability 
depends on whether the party is a state actor, not whether it is a public entity. See supra note 99. 
However, extending Pickering here ignores the fact that an enterprise’s public entity status is critical 
in the public employee speech context. See May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 
1105, 1109 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e acknowledge that cases such as Pickering and Connick give 
public employees greater rights of free speech than private employees have, but this is not just for 
the formalistic reason . . . that the First Amendment restricts only state action, and not private action. 
The behavior of public enterprises is a political question . . . and since the employees of public 
enterprises have insights and information about the conduct of the enterprise that the private citizen 
lacks, they have a distinctive contribution to make to political speech.”). Arguably, the same 
contribution cannot be made by an employee of a private enterprise that is also a state actor.   
 113 Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 
2489, 2496 (2007) (stating that “[h]igh school football is a game[, g]ames have rules,” and “[i]t is 
only fair that Brentwood follow them”) (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 2498-99 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that Justice Kennedy has “little difficulty” in finding that the 
recruiting rule does not violate the First Amendment based on Brentwood’s “consensual 
membership” in the TSSAA). 
 114 Id. at 2495 (majority opinion). 
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membership in the TSSAA. Because the NCAA is also an athletic league 
in which its members voluntarily participate, it seems logical to assume 
that the Court would apply the Pickering doctrine to the NCAA were an 
NCAA recruiting ban at issue.115  
Moreover, nothing in the language of the opinion suggests that 
the application of the Pickering doctrine was limited only to a high 
school athletic association. Notably, when choosing to apply Pickering, 
Justice Stevens referred to athletic leagues in general, and not just high 
school athletic leagues.116 This distinction is perhaps significant since, in 
other parts of his opinion, Justice Stevens specifically referenced a high 
school athletic league.117 Based on Justice Stevens’ usage of “athletic 
league” instead of “high school athletic league,” in addition to his 
emphasis on Brentwood Academy’s voluntary membership in the 
TSSAA, it seems as though an NCAA recruiting ban would be 
scrutinized under the Pickering doctrine.  
2. Application of Pickering to High School and College 
Employees 
Because the Court did not distinguish between high school and 
college athletic leagues in Brentwood II, it seems as though it would 
apply Pickering regardless of the differences between high schools and 
colleges. Moreover, the Supreme Court cases that have distinguished 
between high schools and colleges have dealt with the free speech rights 
of students, not teachers or employees.118 These cases would not be 
applicable to a rule prohibiting recruitment by colleges and universities, 
since such a rule seeks to limit the speech of the member institutions and 
its employees, not the speech of students. 
The Supreme Court has never distinguished between high school 
teachers and college professors for the purpose of regulating employee 
speech—indeed, the Pickering doctrine has been applied at both 
education levels.119 Thus, the fact that the high school setting is markedly 
different from that of a college should not be of consequence in 
  
 115 The Court has previously held that voluntary participation permits speech restrictions 
even at the collegiate level. In Grove City College v. Bell, the Court held that, although Grove City 
College was a private entity, because it voluntarily participated in a federal financial assistance 
program, it was required to abide by Title IX as a condition of accepting the assistance. 465 U.S. 
555, 575-76 (1984). 
 116 Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495 (2007) (“Just as the government’s interest in 
running an effective workplace can in some circumstances outweigh employee speech rights, so too 
can an athletic league’s interest in enforcing its rules sometimes warrant curtailing the speech of its 
voluntary participants.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 117 Id. at 2495-96.  
 118 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.  
 119 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 594-98 (1972) (junior college 
professor’s speech); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564-67 (1968) (high school teacher’s 
speech). 
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determining whether to apply the Pickering doctrine to restrict the speech 
of coaches. 
Nevertheless, some courts have indicated that college professors 
are entitled to more First Amendment protection in order to ensure 
“academic freedom,”120 because universities are places of “free-wheeling 
inquiry” and not designed for the “selective conveyance of ideas” like 
high schools.121 Yet, regardless of whether or not college professors are 
entitled to more protection than high school teachers, the reason behind 
granting further protection, a teacher’s “right to choose classroom 
content and methodology,”122 does not apply in the context of athletic 
recruitment. In communicating with student-athletes about possibly 
attending their institution and playing for their school’s athletic team, 
college coaches are simply not choosing “classroom content and 
methodology.”123   
3. Differences Between High School and College Students and 
Institutions  
Even if the Court were inclined to find the difference between 
the TSSAA and the NCAA important here,124 Pickering should still 
apply. In certain areas, courts have distinguished between colleges and 
high schools in terms of determining free speech rights.125 Generally, 
there have been two reasons for such a distinction: (1) the different 
missions of high schools and colleges and (2) the difference in maturity 
between high school and college students.126 In the context of athletic 
recruiting, these distinctions are largely immaterial.  
First, the claimed missions of the respective associations are not 
different in the context of athletics. Although some believe high school 
athletics serves an entirely different purpose then college athletics,127 the 
respective missions of both the NCAA and the TSSAA indicate 
otherwise. For example, the purpose of the TSSAA is “to stimulate and 
  
 120 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006) (recognizing that there is an 
argument that “expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates 
additional constitutional interests” that are not fully protected by the public employee speech 
doctrine); Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907, 
912 (2006) (discussing that lower courts allow substantially more restrictions against primary and 
secondary school teachers than college and university professors). 
 121 Kenneth Lasson, Controversial Speakers on Campus: Liberties, Limitations, and 
Common-Sense Guidelines, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 39, 65 & n.127 (quoting Bd. of Educ., Island 
Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122 See Schauer, supra note 120, at 911. 
 123  Id. 
 124 The Court may, for example, find that the students have a right to access the 
information, putting at issue the students’ First Amendment rights.  
 125 See discussion supra Part III.B.  
 126 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
 127 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.  
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regulate the athletic relations of the secondary schools in Tennessee.”128 
Similarly, the purpose of the NCAA is to “govern competition in a fair, 
safe, equitable, and sportsmanlike manner, and . . . integrate 
intercollegiate athletics into higher education . . . .”129 In passing its 
recruiting rule, the TSSAA asserted three interests: “(1) to keep high 
school athletics in their proper place subordinate to academics[,] . . . (2) 
to protect student athletes from exploitation[, and (3) to] foster[] a level 
playing field between the various member schools.”130 Similarly, the 
NCAA claims to promote “[t]he supporting role that intercollegiate 
athletics plays in the higher education mission,” and the “collegiate 
model of athletics in which students participate as an avocation . . . .”131 
Moreover, the NCAA’s recruiting rules are set out “to shield 
[prospective student-athletes] from undue pressures,”132 and “to protect 
and enhance the physical and educational well-being of student-
athletes.”133 
Not only do the organizations’ stated missions and policies 
indicate that the NCAA and the TSSAA have similar purposes, but at 
least one court has agreed that high school and college athletics serve 
similar purposes. According to the Tenth Circuit, there is “no more than 
a difference in degree” between high school and college athletic 
programs.134 The court continued: 
The fundamental positions are the same, the goals are the same, the stakes are 
pretty much the same. The same relationship also exists between the primary 
academic functions of the schools in each category and the athletic programs. 
The differences in degree or magnitude do not lead to a different result. In each, 
the athletic program is very important, as are the many other diverse functions, 
programs, and activities not within the academic core.135 
Thus, while in terms of academics, the respective missions of 
high schools and colleges may be different,136 in terms of athletics, the 
missions of high schools and colleges are very similar: both seek to 
promote athletics as a part of the educational experience. Because of 
their similar missions, the Court need not distinguish between the 
TSSAA and the NCAA when determining the extent to which the NCAA 
can restrict its members’ speech.  
  
 128 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 673 
(M.D. Tenn. 1998), rev’d, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), on remand, 262 
F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2001).  
 129 NCAA, Our Mission, supra note 8.  
 130 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Scholastic Athletic Ass’n, 262 F.3d 543, 557 
(6th Cir. 2001).  
 131 NCAA, Our Mission, supra note 8. 
 132 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at art 2.11.  
 133 Id. at art. 2.2. 
 134 Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 570 F.2d 320, 321 (10th Cir. 1978).  
 135 Id.  
 136 See Lasson, supra note 121, at 65 (Universities are places for “free-wheeling inquiry,” 
while high schools are designed for the “selective conveyance of ideas.”).  
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Second, a legal distinction between the maturity levels of high 
school and college student-athletes is inappropriate in the context of 
recruiting. Collegiate recruiting targets mostly high school students, not 
college students.137 Thus, the target audience for college recruiting is not 
college students, but rather, high school students. Consequently, in terms 
of college athletic recruitment, the distinction between high school and 
college students is inapplicable. Rather, the appropriate distinction is 
between high school students and middle school students, who are the 
subjects of high school recruiting. Hence, the critical question is whether 
the Court would be inclined to distinguish between high school and 
college recruiting on the ground that high school students are more 
mature than middle school students. 
Scholars generally agree that middle school children are less 
mature than high school children.138 Interestingly though, it is not so clear 
whether courts have made this distinction.139 Specifically concerning free 
speech rights, some courts have been willing to grant greater rights to 
students as they progress through elementary school, middle school, and 
high school.140 However, in many instances the free speech rights of 
children—specifically what speech they have the right to be exposed 
to—have not been delineated along age-specific lines.141  Rather, the 
government and most courts tend to lump all children142 under the same 
rubric when determining the scope of their free speech rights.143 If the 
Court were inclined to do the same, it is unlikely to think they would 
distinguish between high school and middle school children when 
considering whether to apply the Pickering doctrine to the NCAA.  
Even if the Court were to distinguish between high school and 
middle school children, it does not necessarily follow that it would grant 
  
 137 See Division I Men’s Basketball Academic Enhancement Working Group, Key 
Research Findings Presented (Aug. 10, 2007), http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/governance/division_I/ 
management_council/2007/October/05_Add_B_BAEG.htm (reporting that thirteen percent of 
Division I student-athletes are transfer students).  
 138 See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, HOW OLD IS OLD ENOUGH?: 
THE AGES OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 28-29 (1989) (noting that twelfth graders have a 
greater capacity for decision-making than seventh and eighth graders); LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEIR 
BEST INTEREST? 53-54 (1992) (noting that a child’s capacity to make rational decisions generally 
increases with age). 
 139 For example, in most states the age of majority for contracts is eighteen and no 
distinction is made amongst children under eighteen. See 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. 
LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9:3 (4th ed. 1993).  
 140 See, e.g., Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(noting that no decisions of the Courts of Appeals apply Tinker-based speech rights to the 
elementary school setting, and that “[t]he ‘marketplace of ideas,’ an important theme in the high 
school student expression cases, is a less appropriate description of an elementary school, where 
children are just beginning to acquire the means of expression”).  
 141 See Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children From Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 
43-44 (2004). 
 142 The definition of “children” is unclear, but it at least encompasses all minors under the 
age of seventeen. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968).  
 143 See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684-86 (1986); Ginsberg, 
390 U.S. at 637; see also Etzioni, supra note 141, at 43-44.  
1232 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3  
the NCAA less discretion to limit recruiting than the TSSAA. Notably, 
while the Court has held that high school students are entitled to free 
speech rights,144 it has also shown a willingness to limit these rights in 
order to protect high school aged children from being exposed to 
unsuitable speech. Accordingly, it has upheld certain government efforts 
to limit the amount of speech high school aged children can be exposed 
to both on and off school grounds.145 The basis for allowing such a 
restriction is that exposure to such material may be harmful or 
inappropriate for children,146 who may not be fully capable of making a 
reasonable decision.147  
The recruiting process similarly exposes high school aged 
children to sensitive materials, which are inappropriate for or harmful to 
them and negatively impact their decision-making.148 Thus, it is likely the 
Court would seek to protect the recruits, increasing the likelihood that it 
would apply the Pickering doctrine when contemplating the 
constitutionality of an NCAA recruiting ban.  
Recruiting has been greatly affected by the rising importance of 
college athletics. Although colleges claim that sports are meant to serve 
an educational purpose,149 college athletics has come to serve more than 
just an educational purpose because athletic programs can produce a 
substantial amount of revenue for the NCAA, their conferences, and their 
schools.150 In addition to direct revenue, schools may accrue additional 
  
 144 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 511 (1969) (“It can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech 
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”). 
 145 In Ginsberg, the Court held that it is constitutionally permissible for a State to protect 
minors under seventeen from being exposed to potentially harmful materials—i.e., obscene sexual 
materials. 390 U.S. at 637. The basis of this holding was the State’s constitutional power to regulate 
the well-being of children. Id. at 639; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 
272-73 (1988) (allowing a high school to prohibit its school newspaper from publishing what it 
deemed to be unsuitable material). 
 146 In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court allowed a high school to limit 
its students’ speech, in part, to ensure that “readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may 
be inappropriate for their level of maturity.” 484 U.S. at 271. The Court continued to hold that a 
school “must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in 
determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics.” Id. at 272. In 
Ginsberg, the Court upheld the State law because it was rational for the State to conclude that 
exposure to sex material could be harmful to children under seventeen. 390 U.S. at 639-43. 
 147 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (stating that the Court’s rulings that the 
State could limit the freedom of children to make their own choices were based on “recognition that, 
during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, 
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them”).  
 148 See infra notes 159-175 and accompanying text.  
 149 See, e.g., Univ. of Mich. Athletic Dep’t, Mission Statement and Guiding Principles, 
http://www.mgoblue.com/clubs/article.aspx?id=74106 (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (“The individuals 
who participate in our department at all levels can learn the benefits of teamwork, self-discipline, 
personal responsibility, the setting of high standards, and the joy of achievement.”). 
 150 The NCAA’s total operating revenue for the 2007-2008 season was $614 million. 
NCAA, Revised Budget for Fiscal Year Ending August 31, 2008, 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/resources/file/ebca1c0e7492aa3/2007-08%20BUDGET%20 
(06-07%20Budget%20with%20moves).pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter 
NCAA Revised Budget].  
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benefits because of college athletics, including increased tuition and fees, 
increased exposure, and alumni donations.151 College athletics is also 
popular with the student body and public at large.152 Because the amount 
of revenue a college earns, the additional benefits it receives, and its 
popularity depend highly on the athletic success of the institution,153 
coaches get paid good money154 and are under intense pressure to have a 
successful program.155  
  
  While large, this figure includes only money earned from NCAA-television contracts, 
NCAA-conducted tournaments, and membership dues. Id. It does not include money earned from 
bowl games, conference tournaments, ticket sales, and conference television contracts. See The 
NCAA and Conference Affiliation, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 5, at 459, 464-66 
[hereinafter Conference Affiliation]. Depending on the conference, the revenue that comes from 
these sources can be quite substantial—in excess of $100 million. For example, the Southeastern 
Athletic Conference (“SEC”) reported that its 2005-06 revenue was $116.1 million. SEC, 2005-2006 
SEC Revenue Distribution, http://www.secsports.com/index.php?s=&url_channel_id=20&url_article_id= 
7426&change_well_id=2 (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter SEC Revenue Distribution]. The 
SEC is one of the “Big Six” conferences—the Atlantic Coast Conference (“ACC”), Big East, Big 
Ten, Big 12, Pac-10, and SEC—each of which accumulates similar annual revenues. See Conference 
Affiliation, supra, at 465-66.  
  Most of this money is distributed to the schools. NCAA Revised Budget, supra 
(Roughly $466 million of the NCAA’s operating revenue was distributed to the schools.); SEC 
Revenue Distribution, supra (noting that all of the $116.1 million was distributed to the twelve SEC 
schools).  
  Notably, the statistics show that most athletic programs lose money. See ANDREW 
ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE 
SPORTS 172 (1999). However, despite this fact, many schools still try hard to turn athletics into a 
revenue builder because of the potential for amassing substantial revenue. See id. at 164; Andy 
Staples, In Big-Time Football Spending War, The Rich Get Richer, SI.COM, Nov. 18, 2008, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/andy_staples/11/18/spending/index.html?eref=T1. 
Moreover, the deficits of athletic programs seem to be decreasing. See NCAA, 2002-03 REVENUES 
AND EXPENSES OF DIVISIONS I AND II INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC PROGRAMS REPORT 18 (2003), 
available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/2002-03_d1_d2_rev_expd8af0a75-
a361-4cf9-bfde-32afdc06f5ca.pdf (last visited, Jan.3, 2009).  
 151 See Tanyon T. Lynch, Quid Pro Quo: Restoring Educational Primacy to College 
Basketball, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 595, 601 (2002); see also Staples, supra note 150 (noting that 
schools invest money in college football for “financial reasons, public relations reasons and 
community building reasons”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 152 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 196 (noting college sports’ popularity and 
importance in our culture).  
 153 A large part of the NCAA revenue is distributed to Division-I conferences according 
to their past success in the NCAA men’s basketball tournament. See Roger C. Noll, The Business of 
College Sports and the High Cost of Winning, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 5, at 477, 
482-85. Also, the money conferences receive for bowl games, television contracts, etc., depends 
highly on the success of their schools. See Keith Darcé, Boost from Bowls, SIGNONSANDIEGO.COM, 
Dec. 23, 2007, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/business/20071223-9999-1b23bowls.html 
(reporting that the conferences whose schools played in the 2007 Poinsettia Bowl, a low-level bowl, 
received $750,000, the conferences whose schools played in the 2007 Holiday Bowl, considered a 
mid-level bowl, earned $2.5 million, and the conferences whose teams played in the BCS bowls, the 
most prestigious bowls, earned the most). 
  While many are skeptical that athletic success leads to increased alumni giving, see 
ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 167-69 (1999), there is evidence that athletic success can result in an 
increase in applications and an expansion in the student body. See id. at 169-71.   
 154 See BRUCE FELDMAN, MEAT MARKET: INSIDE THE SMASH-MOUTH WORLD OF 
COLLEGE FOOTBALL RECRUITING 57 (2007) (citing a 2006 USA Today study which reported that 42 
of 119 Division I-A college football coaches made over $1 million). 
 155 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 203-04 (stating that coaches are expected to 
produce winners and if they do not they are fired); Bobby Bowden, Tension, Pain, Satisfaction: 
Inside the Recruiting Game, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1988, § 5, at 7 (same).  
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Recruiting is vital to the success of the program. According to 
Bobby Bowden, the current coach of the Florida State University football 
team and the winningest coach in NCAA Division I-A football history,156 
“National championships can be won in February by those who sign the 
best prospects.”157 Even low-profile sports rely heavily on recruiting. 
According to the former Harvard women’s swimming coach, Maura 
Costin Scalise, ninety-five percent of her success was due to recruiting.158   
Because of the importance of recruiting premiere prospects, 
coaches take recruiting very seriously.159 Many coaches are willing to use 
whatever means necessary to obtain recruits’ services.160 Examples of the 
measures taken by teams to lure recruits include exposing recruits to 
drugs, alcohol, and sex,161 providing recruits with money and jobs,162 
altering grades and test scores,163 harassing recruits,164 and even 
misleading recruits.165 In addition, coaches consistently attempt to 
capitalize on the emotions and fantasies of the young and impressionable 
recruits, many of whom dream of being a college and professional sports 
star.166 By including recruits in such a corrupt process, coaches create an 
  
 156 Florida State University, Official Athletic Site of Florida State University: Bobby 
Bowden Profile, http://seminoles.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/bowden_bobby01.html (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2008). 
 157 Bowden, supra note 155, at 57.  
 158 WILLIAM G. BOWEN & SARAH A. LEVIN, RECLAIMING THE GAME: COLLEGE SPORTS 
AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 43 (2003). 
 159 For an insightful and in-depth account of the intensity of the recruiting process for big-
time college football, see FELDMAN, supra note 154; see also Bowden, supra note 155, at 57 (stating 
that the recruiting team at Florida State included “one full-time secretary, 10 assistant coaches and 
five graduate assistants”).  
 160 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 204 (“The incentive is clear: do all you can to win. 
Whatever it takes.”); Bowden, supra note 155, at 57 (discussing how the pressure to win leads some 
coaches to cheat); O’Neil, supra note 12 (discussing how coaches resort to ethically questionable 
tactics to lure recruits).  
 161 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text; see also MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE 
SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT VS. THE UNIVERSITY 248 (1990) (discussing how 
colleges have attractive women “date” recruits for their weekend visit). 
 162 See JOHN F. ROONEY, JR., THE RECRUITING GAME 136-37 (1980) (noting that schools 
sometimes provide players with cars, apartments, money, and questionable or non-existent jobs). 
 163 See id.  
 164 See Text-Messaging Ban to Be Implemented Aug. 1, ESPN.COM, Apr. 26, 2007, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2850555 (reporting a story of one athlete “waking up 
and having 52 text messages”). 
 165 See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992). Ross was a promising 
high school basketball player recruited to play at Creighton University. Id. at 411. According to 
Ross, he was assured that he “would receive a meaningful education while at Creighton.” Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). However, it was evident that Ross was not capable of receiving such 
an education. See id. at 412; see infra note 176 and accompanying text; see also ROONEY, supra note 
162, at 136 (noting that coaches sometimes “promis[e] one package of financial aid and deliver[] 
another” to recruits).  
 166 See SPERBER, supra note 161, at 249 (claiming that the recruiting process “offer[s] a 
fantasy world filled with free and almost unlimited pleasures”); Bowden, supra note 155 (stating that 
part of the recruiting process is “inflat[ing] the egos of 17-year-old athletes,” only to deflate them 
later); Staples, supra note 4 (quoting the director of football recruiting at Oregon University as 
saying that “[w]e had to find a way to make [recruits] larger than life”) (internal quotations omitted); 
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environment that is harmful and inappropriate for high school aged 
children.167 This is evidenced by the inability of recruits to make a well-
reasoned decision amidst this environment.  
While high school students may be more capable of making a 
reasonable decision than eighth graders, some scholars suggest that even 
twelfth graders’ decision-making ability is hampered by their yet-
uncontrolled emotions. According to Anna Freud,168 the decision-making 
capabilities of adolescents are negatively impacted by their emotions and 
fantasies more so than adults, lessening the likelihood that an adolescent 
will make a well-reasoned decision.169 Perhaps, by catering to the 
fantasies and emotions of student-athletes, the recruiting process inhibits 
the ability of recruits to make a reasonable decision as to where to attend 
college.170 Specific evidence supports the idea that many prospective 
student-athletes make a less than well-reasoned decision when 
determining which college to attend. For example, recruits have chosen 
schools based solely on their dreams of playing professional sports,171 
fake books and magazine covers that played on these dreams,172 their 
weariness with the recruiting process,173 and even what number they can 
wear.174 Moreover, when committing to a school, recruits sign letters of 
intent that are borderline unconscionable.175  
  
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th 
Cong. 20-25 (2004) (testimony of Don McPherson, Executive Director, Sports Leadership Institute, 
Adelphi University) [hereinafter McPherson Testimony]. According to Don McPherson, the 
Executive Director of the Sports Leadership Institute at Adelphi University, for many elite student-
athletes, “higher education is not in their plans” and they have little interest in being in college. Id. at 
24. Rather, college sports is a “stepping stone” to the next level of play: professional sports. Id.   
 167 See SPERBER, supra note 161, at 248 (“Once on campus the recruit experiences forty-
eight hours of high-pressure sales pitches and higher-pressure pleasures.”).  
 168 Freud was a leading researcher in the field of child psychiatry. Cf. GROUP FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 138, at 1. 
 169 Id. at 31-35.  
 170 Recruits, even those with non-professional aspirations, place a lot of emphasis on 
recruiting when determining which school to attend. JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, 
THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 312 (2001). According to one 
study, which polled student-athletes at some Division I-A, Ivy League, and Coed Liberal Arts 
Colleges, in 1989 73% of all male student-athletes said being recruited was a “very important” 
reason for choosing their college. Id. This number rose from 36% in 1976. Id. For women, the 
number was only 29%, but this was up from 4% in 1976. Id. at 334. The authors speculate that both 
of these numbers have likely since increased. Id. at 259-60. 
 171 See McPherson Testimony, supra note 166. Unfortunately, the reality of the situation 
is that almost all—i.e., over ninety-five percent—of college athletes will not continue to play sports 
at a professional level. See NCAA, Estimated Probability of Competing in Athletics Beyond the 
Interscholastic High School Level, http://www.ncaa.org/research/prob_of_competing/ (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2009). 
 172 See Staples, supra note 4 (noting that several recruits chose to attend the University of 
Oregon because of fake comic books, in which the recruits led the team to a national championship, 
and fake Sports Illustrated covers, in which a recruit was holding the Heisman Trophy).  
 173 See, e.g., BOWEN & LEVIN, supra note 158, at 49 (stating that some athletes commit to 
a school merely to end the recruiting process).  
 174 See FELDMAN, supra note 154, at 304. Feldman recounted the press conference of 
Robert Elliott, a recruit who decided to attend Mississippi State University because  
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The fact that recruits engage in such suspect practices when 
deciding where to go to college indicates that the recruiting process may 
be inappropriate for many recruits, or, at worst, even harmful to them.176 
Since the Supreme Court has shown a predisposition to protect high 
school aged children from being exposed to inappropriate or harmful 
materials, it is reasonable to believe that the Court would not afford high 
school student-athletes greater access to recruiting speech than it gave to 
middle school student-athletes in Brentwood II.177 
4. Summary  
Although the NCAA and the TSSAA govern student-athletes of 
different ages, there are a variety of reasons why the Supreme Court 
would not distinguish between the two in the context of recruiting. 
Specifically, the language and reasoning of the Brentwood II decision 
and prior Supreme Court jurisprudence suggest such a difference is 
immaterial. Consequently, it seems that the same legal standards the 
Supreme Court used to evaluate the TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule 
would govern an NCAA recruiting ban. Under these standards, the 
NCAA would have the authority to impose restrictions so long as those 
restrictions do not contravene the Pickering doctrine. Accordingly, an 
NCAA recruiting ban would only be upheld if it would survive scrutiny 
under the Pickering doctrine.  
  
Coach Croom told me I could come in and wear No. 2. It was really where I could go and 
feel comfortable and rock my No. 2. I’ve been wearing it since Pee Wee, and that’s the 
only number I can rock. If I put something else on, it won’t look right on me. I figure, 
you’ve got to look good to play good. I can’t wear those double-digit numbers. 
Id.  
 175 See Seth Davis, To Sign or Not to Sign, SI.COM, Nov. 14, 2008, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/writers/seth_davis/11/13/national.letter/index.html. Letters of 
Intent are forms signed by recruits which bind the recruits to a school. Id. They are voluntary, overly 
restrictive, non-negotiable, and very difficult to rescind. Id. While recruits get some benefit from 
them, according to Davis they are unfair and even “farcical.” Id. According to Pete Rush, a lawyer 
quoted in the piece, they may be unconscionable. Id. Nonetheless, every year over “30,000 
[student-]athletes sign national letters of intent” because, according to Davis, “that’s what everybody 
does.” Id.  
 176 See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992). Ross enrolled at 
Creighton from 1978 to 1982 but did not receive nearly enough credits to graduate. Id. After he left 
Creighton, Ross enrolled “for a year of remedial education at the Westside Preparatory 
School[,] . . . attend[ing] classes with grade school children.” Id. He later enrolled at Roosevelt 
University. Id. After dropping out of Roosevelt, Ross had a “‘major depressive episode,’ during 
which he barricaded himself in a Chicago motel room and threw furniture out the window” in an 
expression of anger against “Creighton employees who had wronged him.” Id. 
 177 Importantly, this Note is not suggesting that Ginsberg or Hazelwood would be the 
basis for limiting recruiting speech. Rather, it is suggesting that, because the Court has previously 
protected high school students from inappropriate and harmful speech, it would be less inclined to 
distinguish between high school and college recruiting when determining whether to apply the 
Pickering doctrine to a hypothetical NCAA recruiting ban.  
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C.  Why an NCAA Recruiting Ban Would Survive Scrutiny Under 
Pickering  
If the Court were inclined to subject an NCAA recruiting ban to 
the Pickering doctrine, the next inquiry would be whether such a ban 
would be constitutional under the three-pronged test. As indicated above, 
the first part of this test asks whether the employee is speaking as a 
private citizen.178 If the employee is speaking as a private citizen, a court 
must then determine whether the employee is speaking on a matter of 
public concern.179 Finally, if the employee meets these threshold 
requirements, a court must apply a balancing test to determine whether 
the employee’s interests as a citizen in commenting upon matters of 
public concern outweigh the employer’s interest in promoting the 
efficiency of its operation.180 Put more succinctly, the three-pronged 
Pickering doctrine holds that, when employees are speaking as citizens 
about matters of public concern, their speech can be restricted only when 
necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.181  
1. Employee Speaking as a Citizen 
Although in Brentwood II the Court did not address this 
threshold issue, assuming instead that Coach Flatt was speaking as a 
citizen,182 it is likely that a college coach’s recruiting speech would not 
survive scrutiny under Garcetti.183 In Garcetti, the Supreme Court 
concluded that “when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes . . . .”184 Although it did state that a formal job 
description is not dispositive of an employee’s official duties,185 the Court 
did not provide a framework for defining the scope of an employee’s 
official duties, leaving the task to the lower courts.186 As a result, lower 
courts have relied on the rationale of Garcetti187 as well as their own 
  
 178 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.  
 179 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 180 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.  
 181 Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 
2489, 2495 (2007).  
 182 Id. 
 183 Notably, in Garcetti, the Court declined to decide whether the threshold requirement 
would apply to speech involving “academic scholarship or classroom instruction.” Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006). However, since recruiting involves neither “academic 
scholarship” nor “classroom instruction,” there is no reason to think the Court would not extend 
Garcetti to an NCAA recruiting ban.  
 184 Id. at 1960. 
 185 Id. at 1961-62. The Court’s fear was that an employer could overly restrict an 
employee’s rights by creating broad job descriptions. Id. 
 186 Id. at 1961.  
 187 See, e.g., Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“Garcetti did not explicate what it meant to speak ‘pursuant to’ one’s ‘official duties’ . . . . Thus, in 
order to determine whether Williams wrote these memoranda pursuant to his responsibilities as 
 
1238 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3  
definitions of “official duties” in determining whether speech could be 
restricted.188 Under either analysis, recruiting speech does not pass this 
threshold test. 
First, the rationale behind Garcetti indicates that recruiting 
speech is spoken pursuant to a college coach’s official duties. In 
Garcetti, the Supreme Court stipulated that an employer can restrict 
speech that “owes its existence to a public employee’s professional 
responsibilities.”189 Accordingly, it distinguished Garcetti, in which 
Richard Ceballos, because of his duties as a deputy district attorney, 
notified his superiors about misstatements made in affidavits, from 
Pickering, in which Pickering challenged a school’s allocation of 
financial resources. The Court explained that Pickering’s speech “had no 
official significance and bore similarities to letters submitted by 
numerous citizens every day.”190 Certainly, recruiting speech is much 
closer to Ceballos’ speech than Pickering’s. Unlike the speech in 
Pickering, recruiting speech is promulgated only as a requirement of the 
position and bears little resemblance to other citizens’ communications. 
Clearly then, recruiting speech “owes its existence”191 to a college 
coach’s responsibility to recruit student-athletes. 
Second, recruiting also falls under the “official duties” of a 
college coach, as defined by lower courts. Lower courts have commonly 
defined “official duties” as activities performed by an employee that are 
required as part of his or her job.192 Recruiting speech is certainly a 
required part of a college coach’s job. Most, if not all, college coaches’ 
official job descriptions include recruiting prospective student-athletes.193 
This requirement is not hollow; given the importance of recruiting, it is 
unquestionable that recruiting is a required part of the job.194  
  
Athletic Director, we must also look to the facts and rationale underlying Garcetti.”); Jackson v. 
Jimino, 506 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109-11 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting the notion that Garcetti created a 
bright-line rule, choosing instead to apply a fact-based inquiry when determining whether an 
employee speaks as a citizen). 
 188 See infra note 192 and accompanying text.  
 189 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.  
 190 Id. 
 191  Id. 
 192 See, e.g., Williams, 480 F.3d at 693 (holding that job-required speech is unprotected 
because it falls within a public employee’s official duties); Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 
451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (same).  
 193 See, e.g., Bates College, Job Opening: Head College Squash Coach, 
http://www.squashtalk.com/jobs/2007/jobs07-30.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (listing recruiting 
contacts and communication as “essential job functions”); College of the Holy Cross, Assistant 
Coach Men’s Baseball, http://holycross.interviewexchange.com/jobofferdetails.jsp;jsessionid=0026F49A8 
67D037E77804FB0E2968659?JOBID=7415 (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (describing job 
responsibilities as “assist[ing] with all areas of the program including, but not limited to, coaching 
and recruiting”).  
 194 See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text. As further evidence of the 
importance of recruiting, see SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 170, at 259, in which the authors 
discuss just how prevalent recruiting is. According to Shulman and Bowen, almost twenty years ago, 
about ninety percent of the men who played basketball, football, and hockey, and two-thirds of men 
playing other sports, reported that they were recruited. Id. Moreover, the authors reported that when 
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Since recruiting is an “official duty” of a college coach and 
recruiting speech “owes its existence” to this duty, a challenge to an 
NCAA recruiting ban would not survive scrutiny under Garcetti.195 
Failure to satisfy this threshold requirement would end the inquiry 
immediately and result in the upholding of an NCAA recruiting ban as a 
valid restriction of its members’ speech.  
2. Speech as a Matter of Public Concern 
Even if a court does conclude that a coach recruiting prospective 
student-athletes speaks as a private citizen, that speech must address a 
matter of public concern in order to survive the second threshold 
inquiry.196 As the Supreme Court stated in Connick v. Myers, whether an 
employee speaks on a matter of public concern is determined by the 
“content, form, and context” of the speech.197 In Myers, the Court 
concluded that Myers’ questionnaire to fellow assistant district attorneys 
did not constitute a matter of public concern because it was a “mere 
extension[]” of a personal grievance with the employer.198 
Since Connick, the contours of the public concern test have not 
been distinctly defined;199 however, subsequent cases have provided 
some guidance. For example, in Rankin v. McPherson,200 the Court held 
that private remarks made to a co-worker expressing support for an 
assassination attempt on the President constituted a matter of public 
concern.201 Through its holding, the Court emphasized that speech need 
not be made public, and can be either inappropriate or controversial, to 
  
asked about the odds someone could appear on campus and make a team without the coach knowing 
them, an admissions dean answered “essentially zero.” Id. at 39. 
  Notably, two years later, Bowen and Levin reported numbers which indicated that the 
number of recruited athletes may be a little lower than the original numbers. BOWEN & LEVIN, supra 
note 158, at 419. Importantly though, Bowen and Levin applied a more demanding definition of 
“recruited athletes” that surely did not include all recruits. Compare id. at 69 (recruited athletes are 
athletes “who were on a coach’s list at the time admissions decisions were being made”), with 
SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 170, at 38 (recruited athletes were determined by student-athlete 
surveys).  
 195 Although the applicable relationship here might be the NCAA-member institution 
arrangement, an argument that the Court would look at the member institution’s official duties is 
misguided given the Court’s language in Brentwood II. By assuming that Coach Flatt was speaking 
as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and not Brentwood Academy, the Court seemed to 
indicate that the duties of the coach were at issue in a Garcetti inquiry, not the school. Tenn. 
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495 (2007).  
 196 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.  
 197 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).  
 198 Id. at 148.  
 199 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam) (“Although the 
boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined, Connick provides some guidance.”).  
 200 483 U.S. 378 (1987).  
 201 Id. at 386-87. While engaged in a private conversation about an assassination attempt 
on the President, McPherson told a co-worker “if they go for him again, I hope they get him.” Id. at 
381. The comment was overheard by another employee and reported to the employer, who fired 
McPherson. Id. at 381-82.  
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constitute a matter of public concern.202 In City of San Diego v. Roe, the 
Court held that a police officer’s sexually explicit videos did not 
constitute a matter of public concern.203 In its holding, the Court 
attempted to clarify the definition of what constitutes public concern, 
stating that “public concern is something that is a subject of legitimate 
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and 
concern to the public at the time of publication.”204  
Despite this guidance, lower federal courts have found the public 
concern test to be imprecise.205 As a result, courts have taken different 
approaches in determining what constitutes a matter of public concern. 
Some courts have focused on whether the speech was made as an 
employee or as a private citizen.206 Other courts have focused on whether 
the content of the speech was of private interest or of concern to the 
community as a whole.207 This disagreement over how to define “a matter 
of public concern” only demonstrates that the public concern test is a 
fact-based inquiry, the outcome of which depends on the content, form, 
and context of the particular speech.208 
The content, form, and context of recruiting speech indicate that 
it would not constitute speech on a matter of public concern. Recruiting 
speech entails one-on-one communications between coaches and players 
that focus on student-athletes’ ambitions to attend and compete at the 
respective institution.209 This type of speech concerns an individual 
  
 202 Id. at 386-87. 
 203 Roe, 543 U.S. at 79, 84.  
 204 Id. at 83-84.  
 205 See, e.g., Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1989).  
 206 See Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2002); Gillum v. City of Kerrville, 3 
F.3d 117, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Charles W. Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall 
Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1181 (2007). Of 
course, with the Court’s decision in Garcetti, it would seem that this issue would be addressed prior 
to asking whether the speech touches on a matter of public concern. 
 207 See Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1051-52 (6th Cir. 2001); see 
also Walter E. Kuhn, Note, First Amendment Protection of Teacher Instructional Speech, 55 DUKE 
L.J. 995, 1005 (2006).  
 208 See Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 271 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Our fact-specific 
resolution of individual cases has done little to sharpen the line between cases where the complaints 
about discrimination are matters of public concern and those where such complaints are not matters 
of public concern.”); Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on 
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 75 (1988) (suggesting that lower courts have been 
inconsistent in determining what constitutes speech on a matter of public concern because of the 
“almost unbridled discretion given [to] the courts under Connick”); Rhodes, supra note 206, at 1184 
(calling public concern standards “fact-dependent and not always predictable”). 
 209 For an example of the kind of issues the recruits and coaches discuss, see FELDMAN, 
supra note 154, at 154-75 (detailing the efforts of The University of Mississippi coaches to get a 
recruit to meet minimum eligibility requirements, which focused solely on the young man’s 
eligibility, and, of course, football—two interests entirely personal to the recruit).  
  Of course, some speech that could be considered recruiting speech would not be so 
personal in nature—i.e., billboards or brochures advertising the school and its athletic program. 
While such speech could presumably be considered as addressing a matter of public concern, it is 
not at issue here since a NCAA rule similar to the TSSAA’s rule would not prohibit such speech. 
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495 
(2007).  
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student’s personal interest in playing athletics at a particular institution. 
It cannot be said to concern community-wide interests, such as 
discrimination or governance, since it is not the “subject of legitimate 
news interest” or “of general interest and of value and concern to the 
public.”210  
Moreover, the intent of the speech is not to address a matter of 
public concern, which, according to at least one Circuit Court of 
Appeals, is important in discerning whether the employee was addressing 
a matter of public concern.211 Rather, the goal of recruiting speech is to 
attract prospective student-athletes to the school’s athletic program.212 
Thus, even if some discussion took place that was of a general interest to 
the public, it would still not necessarily constitute speech on a matter of 
public concern.213 Combining this with the fact that coaches recruit as 
part of their professional duties,214 it is evident that speech intended to 
recruit a student-athlete to a college or university does not address a 
matter of public concern.215  
3. Pickering Balancing Test 
If a court were to determine that a college coach recruiting a 
student-athlete is an employee speaking as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern—or if it assumes as much, as did the Brentwood II Court—the 
final determination would be whether the NCAA’s interest in efficiency 
  
 210 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004) (per curiam). An example of 
private remarks that implicate the general interest of the public is displayed in Rankin v. McPherson, 
483 U.S. 378 (1987). In Rankin, an employee made private remarks to another employee about her 
views on the attempted assassination of the President. Id. at 381-82. The Court held these remarks to 
be a matter of public concern, given the fact that they were delivered on the heels of “heightened 
public attention” on presidential assassinations. Id. at 386. Discussions over a recruit’s ability to 
compete at a college or university does not similarly pique the interest of the public.  
 211 Salehpoor v. Shahinpoor, 358 F.3d 782, 787 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The court will also 
consider the motive of the speaker to learn if the speech was calculated to redress personal 
grievances or to address a broader public purpose.” (citing Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 482-83 
(10th Cir. 1994))).  
 212 See supra note 209.  
 213 In Connick, the Court stated, “[Speech] not otherwise of public concern does not attain 
the status because its subject matter could, in different circumstances, have been the topic of a 
communication to the public that might be of general interest.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 
n.8 (1983). Following this reasoning, even if the subject matter of recruiting speech could, in some 
circumstances, be considered addressing a matter of general interest to the public, because the intent 
of the speech is to address personal, and not public, concerns, it does not necessarily attain public 
concern status.  
 214 See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 215 For an example of what courts have found to be matters of public concern, see 
Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 112-14 (2d Cir. 2003) (letter criticizing mayor’s administration 
was a matter of public concern); Victor v. McElveen, 150 F.3d 451, 456 (5th Cir. 1998) (protest 
against racial discrimination was a matter of public concern). For an example of the what courts 
have not found to be matters of public concern, see Alexander v. Eeds, 392 F.3d 138, 145-46 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (complaints about police department’s promotion process were not a matter of public 
concern); Salehpoor, 358 F.3d at 788 (complaint of theft of student’s research was not a matter of 
public concern). 
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and effectiveness outweigh the school’s free speech rights.216 The Court’s 
most recent articulation of the Pickering balancing test—in Brentwood 
II—is that when an employee speaks as a citizen about matters of public 
concern, an employer can only impose those restrictions that are 
necessary for it to operate efficiently and effectively.217 Like the 
threshold inquiries, in applying the Pickering balancing test, the Court 
requires a fact-based, case-by-case assessment of both the employer’s 
interest in operating efficiently and effectively and the employee’s 
interest in free speech.218  
The Brentwood II decision provides some valuable guidance for 
evaluating an NCAA recruiting ban. According to the Brentwood II 
Court, there are a number of harms that could prevent a high school 
sports association from operating efficiently and effectively.219 These 
harms include exploitation of students, lack of competition, and an 
athletic-centric environment.220 Because the TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting 
Rule discourages these harms, the Court held that the Rule is necessary 
for the association’s efficient and effective operation and thus a valid 
speech restriction.221 Thus, it follows that if (1) recruiting high school 
student-athletes leads to similar harms; (2) these harms detract from the 
NCAA’s ability to operate efficiently and effectively; and (3) an NCAA 
recruiting ban discourages these harms, then it would be upheld under 
the Pickering balancing test. 
While the Supreme Court did not rely on empirical evidence to 
support its conclusion that recruiting middle school students could lead 
to exploitation, distortion of competition, and creation of a culture that 
values athletics over academics,222 specific evidence shows that collegiate 
recruiting harbors these evils. First, the recruitment of student-athletes 
has lead to their exploitation. As discussed above, the NCAA, its 
conferences, and its schools receive substantial revenue as a result of 
college athletics.223 Despite this fact, none of the revenue is distributed 
directly to the players themselves.224 Rather, for their athletic 
  
 216 See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 217 Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 
2489, 2495 (2007). 
 218 See Bd. of County Comm’rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 677 
(1996) (“Pickering requires a fact-sensitive and deferential weighing of the government’s legitimate 
interests.”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968) (“Because of the enormous variety 
of fact situations in which critical statements by . . . public employees may be thought by their 
superiors . . . to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to 
attempt to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be judged.”).  
 219 Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2496 (2007).  
 220 Id. at 2495-96. 
 221 Id. at 2496.  
 222 Id. at 2495-96. 
 223 See supra note 150.  
 224 See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at art. 12.1.2 (establishing that an 
individual is ineligible for participation in intercollegiate athletics if he or she accepts payment for 
playing).  
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participation, the majority of student-athletes are compensated with a 
free college education and any other benefits that exist from playing an 
intercollegiate sport.225 Whether or not this consideration is sufficient, the 
basis of this exchange is undermined by recruiting.226 
Because of the emphasis placed on winning in college athletics, 
the importance of acquiring physically gifted student-athletes cannot be 
understated.227 To acquire these top athletes, many coaches recruit 
student-athletes based solely on their physical skills, paying little 
attention to their academic qualifications, so long as they meet the 
minimum NCAA requirements.228 As a result, many of these physically 
gifted athletes are not academically qualified to attend the institution,229 
but are able to attend because college admissions offices lower their 
academic standards in order to ensure the student-athletes’ admission.230  
This is problematic because it will be harder for these 
unqualified student-athletes to receive a meaningful education.231 Coming 
into school, the recruits are at a disadvantage because they are 
academically unqualified to attend the school. Moreover, while attending 
school they have to devote much of their time to athletics, instead of 
focusing on academics.232 Because of the combination of these two 
factors, it is arguable that many, or at least some, student-athletes are not 
receiving the requisite college education.233 By depriving many recruits 
  
 225 See James J. Duderstadt, Intercollegiate Athletics and the American University: A 
University President’s Perspective, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 5, at 560-61.  
 226 See id. at 561 (claiming that “recruiting college athletes based entirely on physical 
skills rather than academic promise undermines [the] premise [of this exchange]”).  
 227 See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.  
 228 FELDMAN, supra note 154, at 157-75; see also infra note 242.  
 229 See Jim Naughton, Athletes Lack Grades and Test Scores of Other Students, THE 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jul. 25, 1997, at A43.  
 230 Bowen and Levin provide a detailed analysis of the admissions advantage for recruited 
athletes. BOWEN & LEVIN, supra note 158, at 69-79. Specifically, the statistics they provide show 
that a high percentage of academically unqualified athletes get admitted to the country’s most 
prestigious universities. Id. at 74-75; see also Lynch, supra note 151, at 602 (discussing how athletes 
that fail to meet school’s admissions requirements can still be admitted through special admission 
processes, often with “no questions asked”). 
 231 See William C. Dowling, To Cleanse Colleges of Sports Corruption, End Recruiting 
Based on Physical Skills, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jul. 9, 1999, at B9. 
 232 See SPERBER, supra note 161, at 303 (reporting that many teams require fifty hours of 
participation a week).  
 233 While graduation rates are roughly the same for athletes and non-athletes, see NCAA, 
Overall Division I Graduation Rates, http://web1.ncaa.org/app_data/instAggr2007/1_0.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2009), that does not necessarily mean they are receiving a quality education. See, e.g., 
BOWEN & LEVIN, supra note 158, at 129-34, 146-49 (providing statistics that show recruited athletes 
generally perform worse than the remaining student body); SPERBER, supra note 161, at 301 (stating 
that many athletes, including those in low-profile Division I sports, “receive degrees but no 
education”); ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 39-41 (arguing that even student-athletes that graduate 
sometimes receive “totally hollow degrees”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dowling, supra 
note 231, at B9 (claiming that big-time college athletes cannot succeed in school); Pete Thamel, Top 
Grades and No Class Time for Auburn Players, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 14, 2006, at A1 (discussing how 
football players at Auburn University took classes that did not require attendance and received 
substantially higher grades for them).  
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of a meaningful college education, colleges undermine the basic 
exchange with student-athletes and exploit them for athletic success.234  
Second, the recruitment of student-athletes has led to a distortion 
of competition between colleges. Although a new team or two may 
contend each year, for the most part, every year the same teams compete 
for an NCAA championship.235 This trend is neither limited to the high 
profile sports of men’s basketball and football,236 nor to Division I.237 
This lack of competition is a direct result of recruiting. Given coaches’ 
claims as to the importance of recruiting to a program’s success,238 it 
should be no surprise that success on the recruiting trail has led to 
success on the playing field.239 Therefore, since recruiting is integral in 
  
 234 WALTER BYERS & CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING 
COLLEGE ATHLETES 299 (1995) (claiming “that the college admissions office and faculty exploit the 
athlete by taking on board a poorly prepared student and providing to him or her course work of 
minimum quality so the athlete can meet minimum eligibility standards”).  
 235 For example, from 2002-2007, several teams have appeared in the top ten of the final 
Associated Press (AP) college football poll multiple times, including the University of Southern 
California six times, the Ohio State University five times, and Louisiana State University, Georgia 
University, Oklahoma University, and the University of Texas four times. ESPN College Football, 
2008 NCAA Football Rankings—Final, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings?seasonYear=2007&pollId=1 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2009); ESPN College Football, 2008 NCAA Football Rankings—Final, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings?seasonYear=2006&pollId=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009); 
ESPN College Football, 2008 NCAA Football Rankings—Final, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings? 
seasonYear=2005&pollId=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009); ESPN College Football, 2008 NCAA 
Football Rankings—Final, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings?seasonYear=2004&pollId=1 (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2009); ESPN College Football, 2008 NCAA Football Rankings—Final, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings?seasonYear=2003&pollId=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009); 
ESPN College Football, 2008 NCAA Football Rankings—Final, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings? 
seasonYear=2002&pollId=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009). Perhaps more indicative of the lack of 
competition is that only three teams of the sixty spots in the final top ten for the past six years were 
from schools outside the “Big Six” conferences. Id.   
 236 In fact, the lack of competition may be more prevalent in low-profile sports. See, e.g., 
NCAA, Division I Women’s Volleyball Champions, http://www.ncaa.com/history/w-volleyball-
d1.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (Only ten different schools have won a national championship in 
Division I women’s volleyball in twenty-seven years.); NCAA, Division I Indoor Track & Field—
Team Champions, http://www.ncaa.com/history/indoortrack-d1.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) 
(Arkansas University has been the men’s Division I national indoor track and field champion 
nineteen times in the past twenty-five years.). 
 237 See, e.g., D3football.com, D3football.com Top 25, 
http://www.d3football.com/top25/2007/week-0 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); D3football.com, 
D3football.com Top 25, http://www.d3football.com/top25/2006/week-0 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); 
D3football.com, D3football.com Top 25, http://www.d3football.com/top25/2005/week-0 (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2009); D3football.com, D3football.com Top 25, http://www.d3football.com/top25/2004/week-0 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2009); D3football.com, D3football.com Top 25, http://www.d3football.com/top25/ 
2003/week-0 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). From 2003-2007, several teams appeared in the 
D3football.com preseason top ten multiple times including Mount Union, St. John’s and Mary 
Hardin-Baylor five times, and Linfield four times. Id.  
 238 See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text. 
 239 Many of the teams that consistently place in the top ten of the final AP college football 
poll have also been recognized as having a top ten recruiting class by college football pundits. See 
Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp? (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2008). From 2002-2008, several teams placed among the top ten in terms of strength 
of recruiting class multiple times according to Rivals.com, including Georgia University seven 
times, and Oklahoma University, Louisiana State University, and University of Southern California 
five times. Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp? 
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establishing success on the playing field, it follows that it is a, if not the, 
driving force behind the current lack of competition in college athletics. 
Third, the recruitment of student-athletes fosters an environment 
in which athletics is valued more than academics. Because of the 
heightened importance of college athletics to institutions, the fact that 
education is the primary reason for attending college is sometimes lost.240 
Thus, instead of an environment which attempts to integrate athletics and 
academics, a different environment emerges which often forces the 
student-athlete to choose between athletic and academic success.241 
Recruitment of student-athletes encourages such an environment, since 
recruiting focuses on the physical skills of a student-athlete, often at the 
expense of academic qualifications.242 By allowing this type of recruiting 
and by encouraging it through the admission of academically unqualified 
student-athletes, colleges are contributing to a culture that values athletic 
excellence at the expense of academic success, the third harm mentioned 
by the Brentwood II Court.  
Like the effect of these harms on the TSSAA, each one of these 
harms impacts the NCAA’s ability to operate efficiently and effectively. 
  
postype=0&sort=0&year=2008 (last visited Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team 
Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp? postype=0&sort=0&year=2007 (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp?  
postype=0&sort=0&year=2006 (last visited Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team 
Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp? postype=0&sort=0&year=2005 (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp?  
postype=0&sort=0&year=2004 (last visited Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team 
Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp? postype=0&sort=0&year=2003 (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp?  
postype=0&sort=0&year=2002 (last visited Mar. 19, 2009). This correlates highly with the AP top 
ten. See supra note 235.  
 240 This fact gets lost on both the players and coaches. See Dowling, supra note 231, at B9 
(discussing a scandal at the University of Minnesota, in which a tutor revealed that she had 
completed 400 assignments for men’s basketball players from 1993 to 1998); Mark Schlabach, 
Younger Harrick Blamed for Fraud, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 21, 2003, at C1 (reporting an 
investigation that revealed that the assistant men’s basketball coach at the University of Georgia, Jim 
Harrick, Jr., lied about his teaching credentials to get a physical education position at the school, 
misled the university as to how the class would be taught, and gave an “A” to three players who 
failed to attend class, do class work, and take the final exam); Andy Staples, Economics of Recruiting, 
SI.COM, Feb. 6, 2009, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/andy_staples/01/23/recruiting.economics/ 
1.html (reporting on a study which found that, for top college football recruits, graduation rates had 
no measurable effect on their choice of school).  
  This fact also gets lost on schools. See Lynch, supra note 151, at 602-06, 608. Lynch’s 
article provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between college athletics—specifically 
basketball—and academics. In arguing that many elite college programs may have lost sight of 
“educational primacy,” id. at 605, Lynch highlights instances where the desire for athletic success 
impedes on the academic missions of universities. Id. at 602-06, 608. Some of the examples relevant 
to this Note include: coaches steering athletes to less demanding majors or courses to ensure they 
will meet NCAA eligibility requirements, athletes spending forty to sixty hours a week on their 
sports, and regular season games and postseason tournaments infringing on class attendance. Id. 
 241 See Lynch, supra note 151, at 604. The unfortunate truth is that often the choice has to 
be athletics, because, if athletes refuse to meet their coaches’ demanding requirements, they will lose 
their athletic scholarships. SPERBER, supra note 161, at 303. 
 242 According to Bowen and Levin, recruitment of athletes in the high-profile sports “has 
become so aggressive that not even lip service is paid to educational values.” BOWEN & LEVIN, 
supra note 158, at 44. 
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The Supreme Court has provided some guidance for determining 
whether a restriction is necessary for an employer to operate efficiently 
and effectively. According to the Court, relevant considerations in this 
test include whether the employee speech “impairs discipline by 
supervisors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact 
on . . . working relationships, . . . or interferes with the regular operation 
of the enterprise.”243 Because the instant situation is not the traditional 
employer-employee relationship, the only applicable inquiry seems to be 
whether the harms of recruiting speech interfere with the regular 
operation of the NCAA. 
Indeed, recruiting harms have impeded the regular operation of 
the NCAA and, consequently, detracted from its ability to operate 
efficiently and effectively. Among the NCAA’s stated purposes are: 
protecting the well-being of student-athletes, ensuring fair and equitable 
competition, and respecting the supporting role that athletics plays to 
education.244 Part of the NCAA’s regular operation includes enacting 
measures to ensure these purposes are upheld.245 Nonetheless, recruiting 
has lead directly to exploitation of student-athletes, unequal competition, 
and diminishment of the educational predominance, each of which 
strikes at the core of the NCAA’s purposes. In undermining the NCAA’s 
values, recruiting interferes with its regular operation and detracts from 
its ability to operate efficiently and effectively.246  
The negative impact of recruiting on the NCAA’s efficient and 
effective operation can be seen in the failures of the NCAA’s current 
enforcement system. To uphold its rules, the NCAA has an enforcement 
division that investigates and punishes rules violations.247 However, the 
high number of recruiting and other violations248 has significantly 
negated the enforcement division’s ability to quash this conduct. Because 
  
 243 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987); see also Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 
F.3d 766, 778 (4th Cir. 2004); Khauns v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1014-15 (7th Cir. 1997).  
 244 See supra notes 129, 131-133 and accompanying text.  
 245 NCAA, Services, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=1355 (last visited Jan. 3, 
2009) (stating that part of its job is to enact regulations to deal with athletic problems).  
 246 Cf. Hinshaw v. Smith, 436 F.3d 997, 1007-08 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that speech 
which miscommunicated the employer’s interpretation of a recently-passed law undermined the 
board’s efforts and was thus unprotected under Pickering); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 149 
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a police officer’s speech, reinforcing perception that police department 
is racially biased, undermined the efforts of the police department and thus impaired its ability to 
operate efficiently). 
 247 NCAA, NCAA Enforcement/Infractions, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID= 
34874 (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 248 For the number of rules violations in recent years, see Wolverton, supra note 4. 
Notably, those numbers include only detected violations; a substantial amount of violations go 
undetected. See infra notes 253-254 and accompanying text. 
  Significantly, out of all areas of NCAA rules violations—i.e., academic, recruiting, 
eligibility, unethical conduct, illegal participation—half occur from recruiting. SPERBER, supra note 
161, at 245.  
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of the NCAA’s small enforcement division,249 it relies heavily on the 
college or university to investigate itself in many cases.250 This tactic is 
obviously suspect given an institution’s desire to act in its own self-
interest. Consequently, the NCAA has increased its efforts to limit 
infractions.251 However, this strategy has produced mixed results. While 
there is speculation that these efforts have curtailed NCAA violations,252 
the fact remains that many violations still go undetected.253 For example, 
the NCAA staff, which receives seven or eight tips a day concerning 
possible rules violations, still pursues only one of every fifteen leads.254  
Because the NCAA has to rely so heavily on the individual 
institutions to report violations, it has encouraged schools to cooperate 
with its enforcement division in exchange for a reduction in penalties.255 
As a result, the penalties the NCAA has implemented to enforce 
violations have been relatively weak.256 The most common penalties for 
major violations of NCAA rules are the loss of scholarships, a limitation 
on the number of recruiting visits, and probation.257 These penalties have 
little effect on the coaches and schools that receive them.258  
Thus, the NCAA’s enforcement efforts have created a system in 
which (1) an overwhelming majority of violations go undetected and (2) 
  
 249 See Lynch, supra note 151, at 612 (“[T]he small size of the NCAA’s enforcement staff 
impairs its ability to detect violations of those rules.”). While the NCAA has increased its 
enforcement efforts, see Wolverton, supra note 4 (“The NCAA has doubled its investigative staff in 
recent years and cut its average inquiry time in half, to about 10 months.”), the NCAA still 
contributes only .99% of its budget to enforcement. NCAA Revised Budget, supra note 150. 
 250 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 174.  
 251 See supra note 249.  
 252 See Wolverton, supra note 4.  
 253 See id.; ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 174 (“[T]he NCAA does not have the resources 
to investigate even 1 percent of the major infractions.”); Dan Wetzel, NCAA Naps During Golden 
Age of Cheating, RIVALS.COM, Sept. 24, 2008, http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news;_ylt=Al9c 
AynbXuRDOAXO_GKxqyw5nYcB?slug=dw-ncaacheating092308&prov=yhoo&type=lgns (noting 
that recently the NCAA has not pursued violations of its rules with much fervor, leading to a golden 
age of cheating in college athletics).  
 254 Wolverton, supra note 4. A good reason for this may be the fact that the enforcement 
division has only twenty investigators to investigate almost 17,000 teams. NCAA, SUMMARY OF 
NCAA SPORTS SPONSORSHIP AND PARTICIPATION RATES DATA RELATED TO THE DECLINE IN THE 
SPONSORSHIP OF OLYMPIC SPORTS 12 (2004), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/resources/ 
file/ebee0945173e990/olympic_sports_supplement.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&attachment=true. 
 255 SPERBER, supra note 161, at 317.  
 256 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 177-78 (“If a violation is detected . . . the penalty 
ultimately imposed is de minimis and getting smaller.”). For a recent example, see the weak penalties 
imposed by the NCAA against Indiana University and its head coach, Kelvin Sampson, for 
committing various recruiting violations. See Andy Katz, Sampson Receives NCAA’s Harshest 
Penalty, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=3725832 (last visited May 18, 
2009). Most indicative of how weak the penalties are is that all the coaches on the then-Indiana 
University staff are currently coaching at the professional or collegiate level. Id.  
 257 See Lynch, supra note 151, at 612; Katz, supra note 256.  
 258 For coaches, see ZIMBALIST supra note 150, at 177 (describing how, despite engaging 
in numerous recruiting violations from 1995-96, UCLA Coach Jim Harrick received no penalty from 
the NCAA and was coaching at a different school a year after the violations were uncovered). For 
schools, see Mahoney, Fink & Pastore, supra note 5, at 452 (citing statistics which show that NCAA 
penalties did not significantly impact team records); ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 179 (claiming 
that during the 1980s and 1990s “it paid to cheat”). For both, see Katz, supra note 256.  
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those that are detected result in rather minimal penalties. For an 
association committed to detecting and punishing violations in order to 
prevent unwanted conduct, undoubtedly this system is inefficient and 
ineffective. By fostering such a system, recruiting is directly responsible 
for the ineffective and inefficient operation of the NCAA.   
Fortunately, an NCAA recruiting ban discourages the recruiting 
harms that cause this inefficiency. In Brentwood II, the Court accepted, 
without inquiry, that the TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule discouraged the 
harms of recruiting.259 Logically, it does not seem as though inquiry is 
necessary since a rule that bans recruiting is naturally going to 
discourage the harms that result from it.260 Moreover, a recruiting ban 
would serve much better than the current framework, which is a 
complicated and extensive set of rules that contain loopholes that allow 
for easy evasion of the NCAA’s recruiting restrictions.261 An all-out ban 
would not allow any room for interpretation, preventing coaches from 
engaging in legal but ethically questionable conduct.   
Ultimately, recruiting and the harms that result from it prevent 
the NCAA from the efficient and effective implementation of its 
purposes. To discourage these hindrances and increase the likelihood of 
an efficient and effective NCAA, a recruiting ban, and not merely 
stronger recruiting rules, is necessary. Consequently, a recruiting ban 
would survive the Pickering balancing test, the final prong of the 
Pickering doctrine.  
IV.  WHAT’S NEXT?: PASSING A RECRUITING BAN  
While the NCAA may have the ability, legally, to pass a 
recruiting ban, whether the NCAA would be willing to impose such a 
ban is an entirely different question. Indeed, the NCAA should pass a 
recruiting ban. Recruiting student-athletes has undermined not only the 
purpose of the NCAA, but also of college sports in general. Colleges and 
universities’ primary purpose is educating its students.262 Sports are 
supposed to play a supporting role to academics and supplement the 
institution’s mission.263 Thus, while athletics certainly serves a purpose in 
the educational mission of an institution, its position is firmly inferior to 
  
 259 Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 
2489, 2496 (2007).  
 260 Of course, an argument could be that a recruiting ban will have no effect because even 
if the NCAA passed a recruiting ban, exploitation, unequal competition, and the primacy of athletics 
would still continue. However, merely because such conduct might continue to occur does not mean 
that a recruiting ban does not discourage it.  
 261 See O’Neil, supra note 12.  
 262 According to the University of Connecticut’s Athletic Department, “[i]ntellectual 
growth and academic progress is the primary purpose for [the student-athlete] being [in college].” 
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT DIVISION OF ATHLETICS, supra note 6. 
 263 Id.  
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education. For all the reasons discussed in Part III, recruiting crosses this 
line, and therefore should be banned.   
Moreover, the disadvantages of a recruiting ban are minimal. 
Banning recruiting does not have a harmful impact on prospective 
student-athletes.264 A recruiting ban need not affect generally qualified 
and physically gifted student-athletes who wish to use their athletic 
abilities to gain admission.265 Coaches would still know who to support in 
this process since a recruiting ban would not restrict unilateral action by 
the student, such as sending video of themselves to coaches.266 The 
student would still be able to access the necessary information in order to 
make an informed decision about the institution he or she wishes to 
attend.267 Finally, it would not harmfully impact the student-athlete’s 
ability to play an intercollegiate sport.268 
The only real negative impact of a recruiting rule is on the 
schools that will be unable to attract highly touted high school athletes 
through recruiting. However, if schools were committed to their mission 
of educational primacy, this would not be a negative at all. Athletic 
success, while desired, is not critical to achieving the educational goals 
of athletics.269  
  
 264 It may have an impact on those high schoolers with professional aspirations who want 
to be at the best program to succeed athletically; however, college is an educational institution, not a 
professional minor league. 
 265 Colleges have special admissions procedures in which they give beneficial treatment 
to student-athletes who may not otherwise be admitted but whose athletic abilities will enrich the 
student body. Deirdre Carmody, Colleges Bend Admissions for More than Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 1989, at B6. This treatment also accrues to musicians, artists, and others who would benefit the 
student body. Id. While these applicants may be not be the best qualified, they are nonetheless still 
qualified to attend the institution according to the institution’s, and not NCAA minimum, standards. 
See id. So long as this procedure is used to admit under-qualified, but not unqualified, student-
athletes, there is little problem with it. Of course, this process would have to be regulated to ensure 
that it is not abused. See Elliott Almond, Athletes Go to the Front of Admission Line, L.A. TIMES, 
May 3, 1991, at C1 (discussing how the special admissions process is used to get admission of 
unqualified athletes).  
 266 See supra note 19. 
 267 A recruiting ban in no way prevents a school from generally advertising their athletic 
programs. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 
2489, 2495 (2007). Moreover, given the popularity of college athletics and the easy access to 
information via the Internet, it is likely that a prospective student-athlete would be able to gain 
substantial information about a school’s athletic program without having to talk to the coach. 
Importantly, with the elimination of recruiting, the emphasis of this decision would hopefully be on 
academics rather than on athletics since, without communicating with the coach, a student-athlete 
would not be certain whether he or she could participate in athletics at the school.  
 268 Certainly, without recruiting there is a chance that schools will admit too many 
athletes, such that some will not be able to make a team. However, this does not mean a student-
athlete will never play sports. Schools have intramural sports, see, e.g., Univ. of Mich., Intramural 
Sports Homepage, http://www.recsports.umich.edu/intramurals/ (last visited, Jan. 3, 2009), and 
students are permitted to transfer. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at art. 14.5. In 
fact, without recruiting, the opportunity to play intercollegiate sports may increase because the 
stigma of the “walk-on” will be eliminated. See SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 170, at 39 (odds of 
making a team without knowing coach are “essentially zero”).  
 269 See Univ. of Mich. Athletic Dep’t, Mission Statement, supra note 149. In fact, less 
focus on athletic success could improve a school’s academic programs. While athletic success can 
bring substantial revenue to a university, most universities, even those with successful athletic 
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Unfortunately, many schools are not committed to educational 
primacy because college athletics is such a lucrative business.270 As 
discussed earlier in this Note, schools receive a great deal of money from 
their athletic programs,271 the amount of which is integrally tied to their 
athletic success.272 By jeopardizing the ability to obtain premiere 
prospects, a recruiting ban has the potential to cripple an athletic 
program’s success, and, consequently, cut the amount of revenue a 
school receives.273 With the possibility of losing a substantial amount of 
revenue, the schools comprising the NCAA would likely not support a 
recruiting ban.274  
Moreover, the NCAA, as an entity separate and distinct from the 
member schools, would have little incentive to support such a ban. 
College athletics has likewise generated a substantial amount of 
operating revenue for the NCAA.275 Unfortunately, the NCAA’s financial 
success has come while undermining its own principles.276 Therefore, 
while supporting a recruiting ban would help the NCAA uphold its 
values, it would also undermine the importance of athletics and 
potentially uproot the financial base of the NCAA. As the NCAA’s 
record has shown, if such a choice presented itself the NCAA would 
likely opt for maintaining the status quo.277 
Thus, while the NCAA seems to have the legal endorsement to 
pass a recruiting ban, it is unlikely that the NCAA would be willing to 
pass one. As a result, it may be necessary for reform to come from a 
higher power. Since its formation in 1905,278 the NCAA has largely 
governed itself; Congress has usually refused to take part in any reform 
efforts.279 However, in extreme circumstances, the government has 
  
programs, lose money from their athletic programs. See supra note 150; see also MURRAY 
SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: HOW BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS IS CRIPPLING 
UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION 219-22 (2000). To remedy this, every year, schools use their 
additional financial resources to “zero out” the athletic department’s books. SPERBER, supra, at 221. 
As a result, “[m]oney that could go to academic programs, student scholarships and loans, and many 
other educational purposes annually disappears down the athletic department financial hole.” Id. 
 270 See Lynch, supra note 151, at 605-07 (discussing how schools have allowed their 
educational missions to be infringed upon in order to maximize revenue from athletics).  
 271 See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.  
 272 See supra note 153.  
 273 See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.  
 274 See Lynch, supra note 151, at 605-08. This is critical because the persons that 
introduce and vote on rules are volunteers from the NCAA’s member institutions. NCAA, Overview, 
supra note 102.  
 275 The NCAA’s current operating revenue is $614 million. See supra note 150.  
 276 See Wetzel, supra note 253 (arguing that the NCAA has forfeited extensive 
enforcement in order to protect its big-time programs and television money).  
 277 Id. 
 278 See NCAA, The History of the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=1354 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2009). 
 279 ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 195-96; Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12-21 (2000).  
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stepped in, pressuring the NCAA to make changes.280 For example, in 
1978, the United States House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigation held hearings to investigate the NCAA’s 
enforcement processes amidst public criticism that the processes were 
unfair.281 Subsequently, the NCAA altered its rules to better address the 
concerns discussed in these hearings.282  
According to some commentators, the current trend of the 
NCAA towards the commercialism of college sports is a call for 
government intervention.283 Moreover, Congress itself has recognized a 
need to protect student-athletes from harmful collegiate recruiting. After 
the Colorado University recruiting scandal in 2004, Congress held a 
hearing on whether student-athletes were being protected in the 
recruiting process.284 Hopefully, the NCAA’s current subjugation of 
academic values and exploitation of student-athletes through the 
recruiting process will inspire further government action, giving the 
NCAA the necessary motivation to pass a recruiting ban.285 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of colleges and universities is to educate. College 
athletics is supposed to play a supporting role in this purpose by fostering 
leadership, physical fitness, and athletic excellence in an effort to 
enhance the educational experience.286 Unfortunately, for a variety of 
reasons, many have forgotten the professed athletic-academic 
relationship. Nowhere is this loss more evident than in recruiting. Driven 
by the desire for academic success, recruiting has become a corrupt 
process that exposes high school student-athletes to inappropriate 
situations, exploits the student-athletes, and sacrifices academic success 
for athletic excellence.  
Fortunately, Brentwood II provides the NCAA with an 
opportunity to reestablish the proper role of college athletics. In finding 
that a high school athletic association can limit the speech of its member 
institutions and their coaches, the Court provides a template for a college 
  
 280 Smith, supra note 279, at 16. 
 281 Id.  
 282 Id.  
 283 Id. at 22 (“If the NCAA and those who lead at the institutional and conference levels 
are unable to maintain academic values in the face of economics and related pressures, the 
government may be less than a proverbial step away.”).  
 284 College Recruiting: Are Student Athletes Being Protected: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 285 Notably though, given the importance of college athletics in popular culture, 
commentators speculate that such a drastic reform may not be realistic. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 
150, at 196.  
 286 Id.; NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at art. 1.2. 
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athletic association to do the same. Hopefully the NCAA, whether 
pressured or not, will act on this endorsement and ban athletic recruiting.  
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